Dr. Mark Cassidy:

It would be fewer net jobs than would have been the case. It is on a net basis. It is important to stress that we still see positive growth for the economy under all scenarios, but significantly weaker economic growth and significantly fewer jobs in a no-deal Brexit than if there was no Brexit, which is the ideal scenario, or if a deal was agreed.

An important factor relates to how those negative effects are distributed. The agrifood and agriculture sectors, the regions that export most to the UK and the regions with a high degree of concentration in exporting agricultural products would be most affected. From a regional perspective, the Border, midland and western region would be most affected. The broad agrifood sector employs approximately 170,000 persons, of whom roughly 100,000 are employed in direct agriculture. The remainder are in food processing and the like. The sector accounts for between 7% and 8% of overall employment in the economy but up to 20% of employment in some Border regions. There are significant numbers of people employed in agrifood sectors, from which probably half of exports go to the United Kingdom.

There are a number of reasons agrifood is most impacted. First, as mentioned, 42% of exports from the sector go to the UK compared with 11% for the economy as a whole. Second, tariffs are applied differently across sectors and far and way the highest tariff rates are imposed on agricultural products. Tariff rates on agricultural products could be up to 50% or 60% for some elements of the dairy and beef producing sectors. In addition, there are non-tariff barriers. If one thinks of the nature of agricultural exports, often they are fresh foods that need to get to market quickly. Additional delays, documentary compliance, etc., create particular burdens for these sectors. Finally, parts of the agricultural sector are not particularly viable at present. The degree of profitability and margins being earned are low in parts of the agricultural sector, particularly beef, which indicates that these are less resilient to the type of shock that Brexit might give rise to.

One question referred to the landbridge case. We have estimates quantifying the impact that this could have. We published a paper on these non-tariff barriers, which showed that in the case of a no-deal Brexit the average increase in the transport journey could be five hours. We have estimates that regardless of all the other effects, these barriers alone could reduce Irish-UK trade by just under 10%.