Mr. Mauro Petriccione:

We could spend much of the conversation on this and other issues. There is the short-term issue of governance regulation and the broader issue of a plan. As far as governance regulation is concerned, on the face of it, it is a one-off exercise. Drafts have been produced, more or less on time. We are reviewing them and will issue a set of recommendations by the end of June. We do not intend to sit in judgment on the Mercedes plan. We will not issue a recommendation that will pass judgment on the quality of the plan or anything else. The recommendation will identify what we see as a lack of clarity on how policies will be implemented and financed because, in some cases, they are simply not clear. A policy may be stated and announced but short on detail. We will also point out to member states whether the policy the plan announces appears to be capable, on the basis of the information provided, of fulfilling the objectives of mandatory European legislation. In a number of cases that will not be the case and we will point it out supported by facts, given that the analysis will be factual. We will point to areas where the plans could benefit from clearer explanations, better analysis and explanations, and we will flag what we consider to be particularly effective examples of ways to address issues in a plan in order that member states will have access to a coherent analysis of how they can improve the plans. The objective is to have better plans at the end of the year and the discussions we have had in the Council working group have been unusually constructive in that respect.

There is a realisation that it is a common problem, that no member state has a monopoly of wisdom and that issues are complicated and need to be addressed everywhere. There is a considerable desire for a common analysis to learn from one another and examine best practice. We are keen to encourage that process. We hope and trust that afterwards it will encourage a permanent move towards better planning in the climate field. We have seen a number of examples that comfort us in that regard. I mentioned my country and the fact that the allocation of targets at a regional level was being replicated in the 2030 targets. We have seen the Irish plan.

The committee knows as well as I what are the shortcomings of the policy. It is a very robust, accurate and honest analysis of the position. There is a good standard of quality in terms of preparing or writing a plan and we would like member states to move towards that standard rather than away from it. We hope and trust this can be continued over time. We will find an informal way to improve it.

Interconnections are absolutely necessary. There is a reluctance from the Commission to speculate about Brexit but to be honest I wish I had an answer to this and many other questions we all have about what will happen with Brexit. It is very clear that the long-term interests of Europe and particularly Ireland, in many ways, are with co-operation with the United Kingdom that is as close as possible in the future. I am afraid crystal balls are not part of the standard kit for Commission officials.

There was mention of review clauses for post 2030 etc. We will have the instruments to react earlier. Even without any instruments, the Commission has power of initiative and we will keep the situation constantly under control. If something happens that proves the current legislation is inadequate, the Commission has the power to propose new legislation on the spot. We have taken care to build into all the legislation approved with a 2030 horizon monetary reporting verification mechanisms of various kinds. There are review clauses everywhere, usually in the time brackets to 2022 and 2025. It depends on the legislation and it varies. Many reports from the Commission will come at least during those years and we may do it more often if circumstances justify it. At least in that period there will be many mid-term reports by the Commission on the basis of which action may be taken to modify the legislation. At the latest, for legislation that must enter into force as of 2031, the process would have to start by 2026, or for a simpler piece of legislation, by 2027. We have an obligation to carry out impact assessments and public consultations and the approval process by Council and the European Parliament is often very lengthy. At the latest, by 2026 members will begin to see the shape of legislation to come.

There was a question on the legal state of the strategy. As it is a policy, it does not have the legal status of legislation. At the same time, I draw the attention of members to the fact that the entire 2030 legislative programme is based on one conclusion of the European Council in 2014. I go back to what I said earlier in that the key is how deep is the consensus around the Council conclusion. We are trying to help national authorities to carry out a more informed domestic debate. Our assumption is that this will produce an endorsement by the European Council that will have much greater depth than it normally has and afford much greater durability and ability to influence. On that basis of such an endorsement, the Commission will certainly take a number of initiatives. I am not in a position to prejudge today what will happen, especially as there will be a new Commission and its identity is not even known yet. I am certain that a number of decisions will be taken, with some in the very short term. These include allocation of research funds and choice of research projects. That is mandated in the legislation now before the European Parliament and the Council. Those choices will have to be made. If the European Council endorses the objective of climate neutrality, I do not see how any Commission could ignore that in deciding the research priorities of the next few years. There is the question of infrastructure and interconnection, whether that is electric or taking in new pipelines, and I do not see how such decisions can be taken under InvestEU, the Connecting Europe Facility or the Cohesion Fund, without making abstraction from an endorsement by the European Council of the objective of climate neutrality by 2050. Those conclusions have a deep impact on legislation and policy making at the European level, irrespective of the formal legal status. So far, the 2014 conclusions have produced a massive legislative programme, with perhaps 16 pieces of legislation over four years. It is pretty exceptional by European standards.

There was the question of what is next in the transition from fossil fuels to alternatives. A fossil fuel is a fossil fuel is a fossil fuel. If we are to talk about a climate-neutral society, we cannot afford to have the word "fossil" in our final energy mix. What does that mean in practical terms? We have an issue and must decide on the future of gas, for example. If natural gas remains a source of carbon, it can only be a transition technology. It is far from impossible that natural gas could remain a permanent part of the energy mix if carbon capture technologies are developed further and employed. The Norwegians have started to propose that natural gas should be used as the main source for producing clean hydrogen, with the resulting carbon being stored in the caves where the gas came from. If that technology can be made commercially viable, it is certainly something we would welcome and support in any way we can. At this stage, we do not know. It would be helpful if member states could help in placing responsibility on the gas industry to decide what it wants to be. Does it want to be a transitional tool or a permanent solution? Will it invest in carbon capture technology and address public concerns, whether justified or not, as even the perception needs to be addressed? The industry can help to reassure the public and it is in its hands. We cannot do it for them.

I will not get into detail but there was a point on migration, urbanisation and public health. It is very clear that unchecked climate change will make all that worse and it already has. The link between climate change and migration has already been proven. Migration is happening that was spurred on by climate change. It is an additional reason the world we have today is one which climate change is making unsafe in more ways than one. We know that and we must continue to communicate that, explain it and use it as part of the rationale for action that should happen faster than it otherwise would.

Looking at the world's situation, it is not as bad as it sometimes looks. I will start with the biggest problem, the United States. In the United States, this Administration is intent on becoming the champion of climate scepticism.

At the same time, there is a very large movement within the United States that continues to move in the opposite direction. At the level of state government, where it is very much a bipartisan issue, we have seen Democratic and Republican Governors continue to be strong advocates of strong climate policies. As for industry, US industry is global. It is as concerned about where Europe is going as where the United States is going. Large multinationals, in particular, have horizons of 20, 30 or 40 years. They see where things are going. They realise their own lack of resilience to climate change will put them in jeopardy. They see their business models crumbling. What we see in the United States is a pause. It is unwelcome and dangerous, but it is a pause. Even China, the largest emitter in the world, is developing a long-term strategy. There is very intensive co-operation between our economic modellers. We have supported China in setting up an emissions trading scheme. It has experimented with seven models in seven provinces. This is a typical mode of operation for the Chinese Government which has now chosen to launch a national scheme based on the European model. We have been co-operating with it for years, offering it technical assistance and support for the scheme, and we are intensifying that co-operation. It will be a hard slog for the Chinese to make it work as we have seen the difficulties we have had. However, the Chinese are determined to make it work. Some 70% of China's energy generation is still thermal, mostly from coal. At the same time, China invests more in renewable energies than everybody else in the world combined. The Chinese have a very large development problem.