Ms Michaela Reilly:

I would like to extend my gratitude for the invitation to discuss some of the challenges the European Union is currently facing with regard to security and defence. On this day it is particularly important to recall why the EU was initially established; to end frequent and bloody wars between neighbours and to unite European countries both economically and politically to secure lasting peace across the Continent. We can largely say that this has been successful. At the moment, however, huge challenges are ahead for the EU in the area of common security and defence. As is true for most of the challenges the EU faces, Brexit crops up in this area. The greatest challenge is the development of a common policy on security and defence that includes a cohesive development of policies with third countries in future missions, especially the UK once it leaves. This policy must simultaneously protect the integrity of the European Union and the sovereignty of member states. It is very important that there is a balance between these three concerns. The greatest challenge lies in finding this balance.

Different visions of the CSDP proposed by the initial "big three" member states, Germany, the UK and France, have long created space for smaller member states like Ireland to avoid hard choices concerning issues of security and defence. A more cohesive EU in the post-Brexit future presents significant challenges for all states that have long thrived in the murky waters of strategic ambiguity.

Indeed, it could be argued that the United Kingdom leaving removes a significant stumbling block for European defence co-operation. British scepticism has previously allowed others such as Denmark and central European states to avoid hard questions on tensions between formal military non-alignment and the realities of being part of a deeply integrated organisation because NATO has long provided what they have seen to be the primary security provider in the European theatre.

The UK’s absence from future Common Security and Defence Policy debates after Brexit will likely push these states into the limelight in terms of blocking or opting out from security co-operation. Our greatest challenge is how we deal with this. While the EU must grapple with the loss of its transatlantic alliance partner, it is imperative that it now attempts to balance a bilateral agreement on Common Security and Defence Policy with the UK that also complements a type of unified EU approach to issues of security and defence, encompassing the considerations of small states, such as Ireland, and big states such as France and Germany.

That is not to say that the EU has not taken any steps thus far. If we look at the decision taken by the High Representative, Ms Mogherini, to forge ahead with the publication of the EU’s new global strategy in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum in June 2016, it is apparent that some attempts have been made by the EU to push ahead with CSDP. Although faced with something of an existential crisis, the EU found a response in building a security architecture to reinvigorate EU institutions and to reunite the remaining 27 member states. This provided a common ground for co-operation without reopening a Pandora’s box of institutional reform that would be required to deal with more traditional areas of European co-operation such as market regulation.

The Common Security and Defence Policy may not have always been high on Ireland’s agenda but the aftermath of the Brexit vote has been particularly challenging for us all. We now must strongly reconsider our own security and defence policy, in addition to that of our position in the wider EU CSDP. Brexit has uncovered a number of political and constitutional fault lines, none more serious than its potential impacts on the Good Friday Agreement. The Government deserves credit for the way in which it has managed the Brexit negotiations to date, particularly in securing support from our European partners concerning Ireland’s position on the Border. However, what price will we pay for this in future negotiations on matters such as common security and defence?

The reduced room for manoeuvre on common security and defence for small states, such as ourselves, in an EU that will be more dominated by France and Germany than before, must be taken into account. In a Franco-German EU, the space for constructive ambiguity is likely to be greatly reduced. Ireland’s hesitancy and ambivalence on this matter may no longer be sustainable. Irish attitudes to European security and defence might best be characterised by paraphrasing Winston Churchill, in that Ireland is with common security and defence policy, but not of it. We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed. It is perhaps time that we do become absorbed in greater co-operation with the EU on issues of common security and defence that extend beyond PESCO, as others here have noted, as we lose the shelter of the UK in future debates.

The threats of a no-deal Brexit and the medium to longer-term security threats posed by any kind of withdrawal have yet to be provided for. Both the Irish State and the EU as a whole faces profound challenges in this regard and are there, as of yet, no signs that neither it nor the EU is prepared to address them.