Ms Cornelia-Adriana Baciu:

My name is Ms Cornelia-Adriana Baciu. I am studying at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University. Today I will address four key challenges facing the Common Security and Defence Policy. The first is related to strategic coherence and internal cohesion. In the counterfactual scenario in which the EU is not able to manage internal cracks such as the rise of nationalism, so-called souvereignismor major differences in member states' strategic cultures, future risks and challenges to CSDP might be endogenous. A failure to co-ordinate efforts on the CSDP might draw Europe back to the US. Some researchers argue it might return the European security landscape to the 1950s. The EU will thus need to find innovative ways to solve the crises of sovereignty of borders and of defence. What Europe wants is not easy to operationalise because of increasing polarisation or even fragmentation of European integration.

The CSDP is a domain in which some argue differentiated integration might work better. This is because states' national strategies are driven by different threat perceptions, strategic environments, capabilities and strategic interests. My research suggests that differentiated integration in the form of a role-player model in the CSDP could enhance strategic knowledge production and capability development. Security and defence collaborative regimes such as the CSDP can have an empowering effect on member states. However, an unintended consequence of the role-player model could be a "Europe à la carte" in which members would only support the policies in which they see a benefit for their own national interests.

I will now refer to Brexit. The anticipated withdrawal of the UK from the European Union is forecasted to strain the CSDP budget. In 2018 the UK accounted for approximately 16% of the CSDP budget. To compensate for this an increase in member states' investments in security and defence can be expected. A series of peace and defence co-operation mechanisms were adopted after Brexit. The major examples are PESCO, the European Defence Fund, EDF, the co-ordinated annual review on defence, CARD, the European peace facility and the European intervention initiative. For the new instruments to be effective it is important for the EU to manage member states' expectations and ensure they will enable the achievement of strategic objectives.

I will now address the external strategic environment and external sources of instability. A particular tendency in US leadership and what some have termed a US strategy underpinned by a logic of "retreat" and "systemic competition" with China have pushed the EU to think more seriously about the scenario of US abandonment. Some researchers argue that strategic autonomy would allow the EU to gain an element of independence from US decision-making and pursue an agenda of international peace and security based on its own normative vision with mediation, diplomacy, trade co-operation, peace missions and global justice at its core. Some argue that the road to strategic autonomy might lie in a merger between the CSDP and NATO, that is, the Europeanisation of NATO. Multipolarity and great power competition represent another challenge with implications for the CSDP. In the future, the EU is expected to aim at having good relationships with all countries and avoid a return to bipolarity. This is because a bipolar logic might push countries to choose and some of them might choose China for economic reasons.

My last point is related to new security technologies. Future and emerging technologies such as autonomous robotics and artificial intelligence can have a disruptive and transformative impact in the security and defence domain. If the EU invests sufficiently in research and development, it might be in a position to harness the benefits of new security technologies. New funding of transnational and interdisciplinary research, under the European Defence Fund inter alia , will have the potential to address capability shortcomings and technological and industrial weaknesses to a certain extent. The EU could establish a new area of competence in dual-use technology, that is, technologies which can be attributed to both civilian and military purposes.