Pearse Doherty (Donegal, Sinn Fein) | Oireachtas source

That is a valid point. The issue here is that those who work at the coalface with borrowers and distressed debtors, for example, MABS, which was referenced in both opening statements, tell us that in approximately 75% of cases where loans have been sold advisors report that the sale has both slowed progress and limited options available to the borrower. That is the reality. If we were dealing with a fund such as Promotoria, it will not allow mortgage-to-rent. There are certain options available with a high street bank that vulture funds will simply not entertain. Is that not the crux of the issue? While they are regulated in the same way, and the CCMA applies to both in the same way, different offerings are available compared to a high street bank. One is seriously at risk when dealing with a vulture fund. Glenbeigh Securities, for example, is a fund that was set up a number of weeks before the sale of 6,000 loans. There is nothing to stop that vehicle or its servicing agents from increasing interest rates for those with a standard variable interest rate. However, it is also the case that there is nothing to stop the banks from increasing interest rates. The difference is if the banks pushed up interest rates they consider agricultural loans, student loans and deposits. These vehicles have only one interest, which is to get as much money as possible and make as much money as possible from the sale of the loans from the regulated entity in the first place. That is where the risk lies, and that is why 95% of those who have had loans sold to vulture funds are in a position of personal distress as a result of this.