Ms Helen Doyle:

We are privileged to be here. As members will be aware, AdVic is a registered charity run by volunteers - by the families bereaved by homicide. We are there for the families and friends bereaved by homicide. Apart from providing information and support, a key objective of AdVIC is to advocate for change in the criminal justice system because we have found that there is a lack fairness for victims, their families and the wider community.

During the years, as an organisation, we have become aware that there is an egregious situation where the perpetrator of a homicide can benefit from his or her act in clear breach of core public policy principles. Article 43 of the Constitution acknowledges the right to "private ownership of external goods" and goes on to recognise "that the exercise of the rights ... ought, in civil society, to be regulated by the principles of social justice". In accordance with Article 43, the Succession Act provides that a person who is guilty of the murder, attempted murder or manslaughter of another person is prohibited from taking any share in the estate of the other person. The Act also provides: "Any share which a person is precluded from taking under this section shall be distributed as if that person had died before the deceased". While the Act logically and effectively deals with the prevention of benefit from homicide under a will or intestacy, it does not address property that falls outside wills or intestacy, for instance, property held jointly - that is the default position for married couples or civil partners - and certain pensions and insurance policies. In these instances, the perpetrator of a homicide can obtain substantial benefits from his or her act owing to the presumption of survivorship in the case of jointly owned property, or by receiving the proceeds of an insurance policy or pension. That is the default position without the taking of a court case to have a constructive trust applied.

We very much welcome the Bill sponsored by Deputy O'Callaghan, as there is an extremely urgent need to address this travesty. While we broadly agree with the provisions of the Bill, we are deeply disappointed that it fails to do what we believe is essential in these circumstances, that is, as a presumption, to sever the joint tenancy and vest the entire interest in the relevant property in the estate of the victim. That is where we differ. AdVIC also believes the provisions of section 46B(1) should also apply, in appropriate circumstances, to any person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of a homicide, which is also in contrast to section 46B(3).

In 2015 AdVIC wholeheartedly supported the provisions of a Private Members' Bill drafted by former Senator Feargal Quinn, the Succession (Amendment) Bill 2015, which was debated in the Seanad. It was held back because a Law Reform Commission report was being prepared. That Bill dealt with the issue of joint tenancy by terminating the joint tenancy and vesting the entire interest in the property in the estate of the victim. That is in contrast to the current Bill, in which the joint tenancy is severed and the property divided, meaning that the killer may avail of a share of the property, to deal with as he or she pleases. We are told that this is to maintain the constitutionality of the legislation, as former Senator Feargal Quinn’s Bill was considered by some to be at risk of a constitutional challenge. We strongly disagree with this contention because the Succession Act, rightly, goes so far as to erase the "legal right share" of a spouse or civil partner who is guilty of homicide. This is on a par with the provisions contained in the former Senator Feargal Quinn's Bill.

I cut some of the presentation because I would have exceeded the time allotted. I will address the severing of a joint tenancy which is prohibited by section 30 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act. It is our contention that this Bill gives a clear benefit to a killer because it allows automatic severance and gives half, with court discretion, to him or her which he or she might never have obtained in the normal course of life. What is being forgotten is we do not know what might have happened in the future. Why should we presume that the person who was murdered would have died first and not the killer? The Bill gives the killer the benefit of the doubt and that is where we differ. There are some jurisdictions that have gone as far as stating it is against public policy to give a benefit to a killer, despite the property rights being argued for all of the time, because social justice should overcome property rights in circumstances such as this.

The argument is made that property rights exist but there are plenty of circumstances where existing property rights are challenged. Under the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act, for example, property can be seized. It was argued in almost every jurisdiction in the world that such a law would not work but it has worked. Sometimes we have to work against the norm and take a step further. In the case outlined, the family had to buy out the killer's share of a property that he may have never have owned in full or in part in the normal course of life but for his acceleration of the severance. That is the core of our contention.