Mr. Carlos Martínez Mongay:

Perhaps in my introductory statement should have given more detail on non-performing loans. The report makes clear reference to the measures the authorities have introduced to provide support to vulnerable borrowers in arrears. We are not saying the level of non-performing loans must be reduced at any cost. Vulnerable borrowers must be protected. I thought that was clear in the report, but I take note that perhaps it is not that clear. There is also a need to alleviate the impact of the working out of non-performing loans on households facing severe difficulties. I agree that the reduction of the number of non-performing loans must balance both concerns - on the one hand, the profitability and the soundness of the financial sector, and , on the other, the situation of vulnerable borrowers.

On the use of the rainy day fund, the flexibility clauses the Deputy mentioned - these exceptional clauses - are on in addition to the flexibility embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact. The Deputy mentioned that this rainy day fund could be used in cases of economic disruption or shocks. In such instances, the economy goes from the positive phase of the cycle, as now, to a kind of recession. In that context, the Stability and Growth Pact has enough flexibility when calculating the expenditure benchmark. It is not only for exceptional circumstances, the flexibility can also kick in depending on the phase of the cycle. It is not the same. The restrictions on expenditure imposed by means of the benchmark are not the same for a country which is at the medium-term objective, which is the case for Ireland, with a declining debt, which is also the case for Ireland, and, for example, which could be the case for Ireland ahead of a shock. If going from a positive or zero-output gap to a negative output gap, the matrix that the Commission uses in agreement with the member states allows for much more room for manoeuvre than in the other case, even without any of these exceptional circumstances.