Ms Orla Hegarty:

I thank the committee for the opportunity to attend this session. Concerns about fire safety are real. The legacy of the Stardust fire in Dublin in 1981 was the Building Control Act 1990 and the introduction of fire safety certificates. These regulations have undoubtedly saved many lives since. We are again discussing regulatory change in the aftermath of another tragedy, that being the Grenfell Tower fire in London in 2017. Both of these events were foreseeable and preventable. It should not take a tragedy to act when the risks are evident and preventable, but warnings frequently go unheeded. Events of this scale do not happen regularly and we can become complacent about the risks.

Fire safety is one of the most visible types of building failure. Other building failures that are damaging to health and the environment often go unreported because they are not so visible and play out in private. They need the same attention in public policy, particularly where there are new and emerging risks. The next pyrite will not be pyrite and the next Grenfell Tower will not be about cladding.

It is evident that Grenfell is part of a very complex failure, in that it is as much a procurement failure as a regulatory one. Combustible cladding was a factor, but it was only part of a bigger story. We can learn much from such events because they point to weaknesses across the sector, including flaws in industry practices, poor procurement policies, inadequate regulatory systems, inadequate controls on how buildings are designed, procured and managed, and a failure to keep pace with rapid changes in technology and materials. In the 28 years since the 1990 Act, buildings have become larger and more complex, housing is being built more densely, and the materials being used have become lighter, more combustible, more toxic and less forgiving of poor design, unskilled workers and inadequate testing and control systems.

I would first like to address some fire safety issues specifically, after which I will briefly mention more general concerns about the risk of other potential building failures. Fire Safety in Ireland, the report of the fire safety task force, follows closely behind two 2017 reports into fire safety failings, one on schools and another on timber-framed housing. There needs to be a follow-through so that the findings of these reports are widely disseminated and actively addressed.

I have been following the UK response to the Grenfell fire very closely. By comparison, the response in Ireland has been limited. No regulatory change has been signalled and no guidance has been issued to building designers. Public safety concerns around this matter are legitimate. The remit of the task force's report was narrow, being limited to buildings of more than six storeys or more than 18 m with external cladding or rainscreen systems. It did not include buildings under six storeys, including apartment buildings, schools, hospitals and other buildings that could be high risk. The technical failings in Grenfell were much wider than the cladding specification.

The task force identified 226 buildings by contacting 31 local authorities to provide statistics. Using freedom of information requests, I have undertaken some research into the data provided. There is no national listing of these buildings - the 31 authorities acted independently and just provided statistics. Each of the local authorities acts as a separate building control authority, meaning that there was not a consistent response. While there was an ongoing issue with monitoring, the report asserted that there was no concern about a Grenfell situation. At the time of the report's production, however, fewer than half of the 226 buildings identified had undergone fire risk assessments. It was premature to say there were no issues or concerns.

The departmental circular on this matter does not address the fundamental issue, that being public safety. The direction to local authorities is cautious and defers all responsibility to building owners on the assumption that they can be identified, which is still not the case in some instances, that they will act promptly and responsibly, that they will have resources to deal with the problem and that remedial works will be carried out correctly. There is no requirement for anyone living in the buildings to be notified.

The Irish building regulations - the technical standards - rely heavily on UK regulations, research, testing and codes. The Grenfell fire is subject to a number of reviews and inquiries in the UK and regulatory reform is being implemented there. It is not clear how the Irish regulatory authorities intend to act in response. Brexit will compound some of these issues, particularly as regards building materials.

The implication of the catastrophic "systems failure" at Grenfell warrants a much broader review and risk assessment. Many issues are technical and evolving and are beyond the remit of this committee or ad hoccommittees. There is an urgent need to re-establish the statutory Building Regulations Advisory Board, which was disbanded in 2012. Following Grenfell, the UK Government established an independent expert advisory panel, and that group has been reporting as the issues emerge.

Policymakers, the construction industry and owners need support. They also need transparency. The Building Control (Amendment) Regulations, BCAR, are not a robust system or entail what is described in the Hackett report. Producing technical building regulations and standards is not enough. They will not be rolled out without addressing the weaknesses across the system, including skills shortages, an absence of technical information, poor procurement practices, a lack of independent inspections and controls, poorly structured and resourced systems for building management, a lack of public information, and a lack of technical support.

There needs to be a system of active market surveillance of dangerous, illegal and fraudulent construction products, as required under the EU construction products regulations, and more active dissemination of alerts for building materials. The State authorities need to be resourced to ensure that public safety is protected. This is not just about high-rise buildings or apartments. It is also about our hospitals, schools, airports, shopping centres, student housing and hotels. The Stardust inquiry was unequivocal about the responsibilities of State authorities to protect the public. We cannot conclude that our systems are appropriate and fit for purpose when people are living in dangerous buildings that have been constructed since BCAR came into effect in 2014.

I will briefly address the issues of damp, mould, condensation and ventilation. Mould should not be singled out. It can serve as a visible indicator of wider indoor air quality problems that can be damaging to the occupants' health and the fabric of the building over time. Modern building regulation standards require buildings to be tested for air tightness to achieve high levels of energy efficiency. Issues of damp, condensation and mould are the result of a failure in the building physics, which can be a consequence of poor design, poor construction, inappropriate materials, inadequate ventilation, conflicting regulatory requirements or a combination of these factors.

The technical issues are beyond the scope of this committee, but this is an area of serious concern, particularly given that some recent research indicates that there are significant levels of non-compliance in recently built homes.