Professor Philip Lane:

If one looks at the evolution of this, preventive measures were taken. The risk factor was recognised by the Central Bank and warnings were issued. The warnings should have been enough. The banks needed to handle their customers coming off fixed-rate mortgages correctly. We introduced a consumer protection code in 2006 which essentially stated that, in handling financial contracts with customers, the banks needed to put the customer first. The scale of ignoring that has been a shock.

The way financial regulation is supposed work is that much happens through prevention. Some elements of this were caught. We think the scandal would have been even bigger without some of the actions taken several years ago. Eventually, we flipped it around. Instead of the banks just working on a point where we see a problem, it is up to them to prove where they do not have a problem. We assume all mortgages have to be examined. When we went universal in 2015, we said it was not enough for us to follow up where we see a problem. What we have seen over the course of the examination - this is why the numbers have climbed - is that some banks have taken a narrow approach trying to limit the scope of it. Only under sustained probing over the past several years has this examination widened sufficiently to ensure all of those who are included should be included.

There are two parts to it, namely, the original problem and how the examination went. It should have gone a lot quicker. It would have gone a lot quicker if some banks had a more consumer-focused attitude as opposed to being overly defensive.