Charles Flanagan (Laois, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I agree that there are a lot of amendments here. In fact, there are more than 50 in the grouping. In response to Deputy O'Callaghan and for the benefit of members who have not yet made a contribution on their amendments, I will set out briefly and clearly the structure of these sections of the Bill and their purpose. Section 9 of the Bill establishes the relevant committees. Section 10 is the enabling provision requiring the commission to select and recommend to the Minister persons for appointment to judicial office through the relevant committee as set out in section 11(2). I remind members that section 10 is being opposed through these amendments. Section 11 provides for the membership of the relevant committees. I note the section is also opposed. Section 11 sets out the committees to be established under section 9. I will not repeat what Deputy O'Callaghan said in that regard. He draws our attention to the section, the content of which is self-explanatory. Section 11(2) provides in the table for the role of each committee in making a selection and recommendation. Section 13 provides for the membership of the relevant committees and other provisions in relation to them. Section 13 is opposed. Section 13(1) sets out the composition of the committees, each of which will have a total of 11 members. All committees will have as members the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, a nominee of the Bar Council and Law Society, respectively, and the lay chair. A committee will also comprise five of the lay persons.

The second judicial member provision is set out in section 13. Section 13(2) provides the detail to ensure that the selection and recommendation of appointees to judicial office in a particular court will be conducted by a committee whose membership includes a judge serving at the level of the courts system to which the committee's business relates. There are obvious and important reasons that should be the case. In the case of a Supreme Court appointments committee, the additional member shall be either the President of the Court of Appeal or, with the concurrence of that President, an ordinary Supreme Court judge nominated by the Chief Justice. Deputies will be aware that these important provisions were not included in the Bill as published. I acknowledge what Deputy O'Callaghan has said. These provisions were included following careful consideration and having regard to what Deputies, including Deputy O'Callaghan, had to say in the course of pre-legislative scrutiny about the need to have all court Presidents as well as the Chief Justice involved in the function of selecting and recommending persons for judicial appointment. The provisions were also developed following a period of consultation with members of the Judiciary at senior level. These sections and related provisions create a structure whereby the selection and recommendation function will be carried out within the framework of the five relevant committees designed to address judicial vacancies in each of the five court levels. This architecture reflects concerns raised by the Judiciary in the consultation process.

Deputies will be fully aware that the Judiciary is opposed to having a majority of lay persons on the commission and to having a lay chairperson presiding over a commission of which the Chief Justice is a member. I am conscious that we will be addressing issues relating to the composition of the commission on a separate basis but I must advert to a particular concern the Judiciary had that all five court Presidents, including the Chief Justice, should be involved directly in the selection and recommendation process for the appointment of persons as is currently the case with the judicial appointments board. Having listened to the views of the Judiciary on the matter, having reflected on the point during the pre-legislative scrutiny debate and having regard to the input of my predecessor, I am of the view that it is desirable to meet this particular concern in the manner set out in the Bill. Rather than to provide for a consultation arrangement with, for example, the President of the District Court, as the ex officioarrangement under the general scheme of the Bill originally provided, a direct decision-making role for each President should be retained. That is what we have under the current process.

Sections 11 and 13 provide that the commission shall act in the form of a relevant 11 person committee, one for each of the five courts. In the case of an appointment to the Circuit Court, for example, the committee will comprise the commission members, with the President of the Circuit Court replacing the Presidents of the Court of Appeal and the High Court and with five ordinary lay members instead of six. It is that committee which will conduct the selection process and recommend persons for appointment to the Circuit Court in that example. While all Superior Court Presidents, including the Chief Justice, are permanent members of the commission through the appointment committees format in the Bill, all Presidents will form part of the decision-making process through the relevant committees in selecting and recommending persons for appointment to the relevant courts. Under section 10 of the Bill, the relevant committees will perform the functions of the commission in respect of the selection of persons for each court. In that sense, they will be the statutory iteration of the commission itself and be empowered to select and make decisions as to who to recommend. I refer again to the programme for Government in that regard.

The chair, the Chief Justice and a number of other members will be common across the relevant committees. There will be a perspective across the entire gamut of selection applications. I say this in response to the point raised by Deputy Jim O'Callaghan who spoke in terms of there being silos in this respect. That will not necessarily be the case because there will be common membership and a common secretariat across all the relevant committees via a judicial appointments commission office, which will be established under the Bill.

I have listened to Deputy O'Callaghan in particular, as well as other members, but I am not minded to increase the number of members of the commission beyond the 13-member composition that the legislation now provides. Nor am I in a position to pull back on the key programme for Government commitments in this regard. I am therefore unable to accept any of the amendments, including amendments Nos. 9, 22 and 23, which have the effect of removing the relevant committee structures in the Bill. I agree with Deputy O'Callaghan that this is the core matter and many of the other 50 amendments are related or consequential. It is important we retain the relevant committees as in the Bill.