Mr. Bernard Byrne:

The three priorities from 2010 for the business were very clear. One was the radical restructuring and repositioning of the bank and putting it in the position to allow the State to get back its €20.8 billion. We keep that at the forefront of our minds by seeing it as €10,500 for every taxpayer. The second was focusing the bank on delivering its core markets and customer base and in the servicing of the Irish economy in a more efficient and effective manner than before. There was also the support of the first agenda of delivering commercial value. The third point was dealing with all the legacy issues that would inevitably arise during the course of the years afterwards as a result of the activities of previous decades. They were the three priorities set out by the banks.

If it is helpful, there is another point. The offshore businesses failed from approximately 2009 or 2010 onwards to be able to upstream deposits. The local regulators became concerned about the solvency of AIB and other banks and it effectively trapped deposits in the offshore businesses. One of the considerations in terms of the strategic review would have been absolutely influenced by the fact these deposits were offshore, remaining offshore and not coming back into the core activity. The issues that determined the non-core nature of the business were very heavily commercial at that point. All the decisions we try to make are very heavily commercial, but we have an overview in terms of the reputation and positioning of the bank. The decision made was strategic and concerned the bank going forward.

I have no idea what happened to the deposits in terms of how they ran out. People would have just taken their deposits. Looking at AIB in a similar period, from 2010 to the middle of 2011, approximately €40 billion of deposits left the bank. They went from €100 billion to €60 billion, and a major outflow of deposits took place. That happened across the Irish system and one of the key systemic problems at the time was the exiting of deposits. It took place in corporate, commercial and retail deposits. It is not surprising to me that those deposits left an Irish-based institution. I do not know if they were corporate, personal or retail deposits.

There was a point on the deferred tax asset issue and I have commented on that before. It is approximately €3 billion. It is slightly less but we can keep it at that round number. Around the time of the recapitalisation and the capital assessment set by the Central Bank, the €3 billion was considered equity. In other words, the State did not have to put in an extra €3 billion in equity that it would have had to if the deferred tax assets had been disallowed. It is very simple and therefore it was capital goods from the State's perspective. It is really a choice issue in terms of how the Government and the Department of Finance considers the matter. Currently, based on closing prices last night, our bank trades at a market cap of approximately €14.9 billion. Included in that is a deferred tax asset of €3 billion. The price to book - how much people pay relative to the book value - is 1.12. They are paying 12% more than the book value of the assets. This is choice for the State. Does it want to realise the cash by selling the asset now and getting cash upfront or does it want to get rid of the deferred tax asset and effectively recover it in the form of corporation tax? It is not our decision and it is part of the taxation matter on the land. Personally, I believe the State has benefited from the treatment of deferred tax as it went in and it can currently benefit from it in terms of a sell-down position. That is a personal view but the Government decides what to do in respect of taxation policy. All we do is comply with what is there and operate to that system. My comments are more about how we can see this playing out more positively if the Revenue Commissioners get the money earlier rather than later.