Dr. Eoin O'Neill:

I thank the Chairman, Deputies and Senators for the invitation to attend and make an input into the discussion on the future of Europe. This is a hugely important issue for every citizen of Europe, especially in the light of the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. With the European Union in transition, environmental considerations are a concern. Dr. Brereton and I are both lecturers in environmental policy at UCD. Our presentation will be focused on the environmental dimension of the discussion.

In presenting a range of scenarios in the White Paper, the European Commission’s stated aim is to start a debate to answer the question, "What future do we want for ourselves, for our children and for our Union?" It puts forward five scenarios: implementing the current reform agenda; deepening only certain key aspects of the Single Market; enhancing co-operation in specific policy areas; reducing its focus to a limited number of areas; or sharing more power, resources and decision-making. The question embedded in each of the individual scenarios concerns the extent to which EU competency beyond the narrowest interpretation of the Single Market should be pursued. Should its scope be widened through further integration, that is, "more Europe", or should it have a more focused and narrow scope, or "less Europe"? Each of the scenarios put forward raises questions about the future level of competence the European Union may retain or have conferred on it in terms of climate policy and the environment.

The European Commission also published a series of reflection papers to discuss what some of the five scenarios might entail across policy areas, namely, the social dimension of Europe; economic and monetary union; harnessing globalisation; Europe’s defence; and the future of EU finances. A notable omission is a reflection paper on the environment. From an environmental policy perspective, we wonder about the extent to which the Commission sees environmental issues as central to this discussion. This is surprising.

The June European Council acknowledged that sustainable development lay at the core of European values. The environment is one of the few areas of the European project that enjoys genuine public support. A majority agree that the European Union is the appropriate level at which to take action. A strength of EU environmental law is that it represents a long-term commitment and cannot be changed by individual governments which are motivated by short-term thinking. It is also a widely held view that the European Union has a strong environmental record. It has one of the most progressive environmental policies in the world. The House of Commons environmental audit committee makes reference to over 800 pieces of EU environmental legislation. It has implemented one of the largest environmental policy instruments in the world, namely, the EU emissions trading scheme. It is a global leader in international climate change negotiations. Over 75% of EU citizens find EU environmental legislation necessary to protect the environment in their own country.

Perhaps the environment does not have as high a priority in the eyes of the European Commission, given the current issues facing the European Union in the form of Brexit, migration, the euro crisis, etc. Irrespective of this, the climate and environmental implications arising from each of the scenarios the Commission has put forward for the 27 member states are very significant, but they are not elaborated on in the White Paper.

We will outline what we believe to be the implications of each of the five scenarios. The first scenario foresees the EU27 continuing to shape the global agenda for climate policy and sustainable development. Progressing this scenario would involve the EU27 continuing to pursue implementation of existing environment-related directives and promoting measures at international level to deal with environmental problems, in particular, combating climate change.

In the second scenario which involves nothing but the Single Market, a reduction in regulation could result, with differences in environmental standards emerging between member states. This would mean that there would only be a focus on the environmental issues that required action to reduce competitive distortions, for example, maintaining basic vehicle source emission standards. The standing of the environment would return to its status in the EEC prior to the Single European Act. With a common position on climate change not necessarily achievable, the European Union as a whole would not be represented at relevant international environmental fora. A race to the bottom could emerge between member states, with divergences in standards, especially for non-transboundary environmental effects, for example, noise or localised air pollutants.

The third scenario which involves those who want more doing more would not see any further EU27-wide integration, unless the EU27 agreed to move forward together; rather, member states would co-operate in introducing environmental standards stricter than those in the European European in accordance with the existing treaties. Just as every EU member state is not in the eurozone or the Schengen zone, a small group of countries could co-operate to pursue more ambitious targets to achieve carbon neutrality, implement higher air quality standards, etc.

The fourth scenario which involves doing less more efficiently could involve a reduction or, potentially, although less likely, an increase in focus on environmental issues. Should there be a reduced focus on environmental issues, attention would still be required, where necessary, for the Single Market, for example, to deal with economy-related environmental problems. Should this arise, environmental standards could move away from harmonisation towards a basic minimum, with a race to the bottom. Climate action ambitions could be diminished, with those struggling to meet their existing obligations opting out and divergences in climate-related environmental performance and perhaps other areas emerging.

The fifth scenario which involves doing much more together could involve expanding the scope beyond existing environmental policy parameters. This would also see the European Union maintaining and strengthening the principles underlining the protection of the environment based on the precautionary principle, the principle that preventive action should be taken, the polluter pays principle, and maintaining its global representation at international environmental fora. In addition, the potential for new environmental taxes such as a carbon tax to be pursued at EU level could be considered.

The "less Europe" scenarios - nothing but the Single Market and doing less more efficiently - share some commonalities with a so-called soft Brexit. For example, Brexit-related research suggests the habitats and nitrates directives may be more impacted on, given that they are expensive for farmers to implement, as would other non-transboundary environmental issues. With differences in ambitions for energy and climate targets between EU member states becoming evident, other research suggests diverging tiers of climate ambition could be widened if the European Union's environmental competency is diminished in either of these scenarios. Should a reduction in competence for the environment be realised within the European Union, it would have negative implications for environmental performance. This should be of concern to people in Ireland, as we have a poor record in achieving improvements in environmental performance in a timely manner, even when obliged to do so under EU directives. More generally, it would damage the European Union's global leadership role. With a common position on the environment or climate action not possible, the European Union may not be represented at relevant international fora. This would prove damaging for Ireland's interests. Divergences in environmental standards between member states would be expected to arise. This would concern, in particular, non-transboundary environmental effects and there could be a race to the bottom. The principal point we want to make is that a loss of environmental competence for the European Union would have negative impacts on environmental quality and citizens' well-being across the European Union, including in Ireland.

We thank the committee for inviting us to attend to make an input into the discussion. We are happy to answer, as best as we can, whatever questions members may have.