Dr. Ruth Fletcher:

There are a variety of positions. As I am not a comparative lawyer, I am somewhat straining my expertise in responding to this question. Certainly in medical law we do see different ways employed by which a kind of constitutional value of prenatal life is devised which is not, however, equivalent to the value accorded to persons eligible for full rights-bearing protection. In Spain, for example, the statutory language refers to the desire to respect prenatal life but states that the best way to achieve that is by providing quality reproductive health care and positive guarantees around maternity. The respect for foetal life is channelled in particular ways. We see these attempts at characterising a value in prenatal life because, as I said, people invest in and care for that life and because it is seen as having a symbolic and potential value for the future. Those ethical concerns get translated into this type of category of a legal or constitutional value that is lesser in weight than that of a full rights-bearing person.