Mr. Michael O'Sullivan:

The report must be read in its entirety because a multiplicity of factors impacted on what occurred. I agree that there was a poor management structure. There is no doubt that it played a critical part. I will focus on management structures for a moment. There were divisions that did not have chief superintendents during the period due to the cutbacks. There were divisions that did not have divisional traffic inspectors. There were regions that did not have regional traffic superintendents. The traffic bureau had no dedicated assistant commissioner from 2008 to 2017. It had seven chief superintendents who stepped in and out alongside their various other functions. There was no superintendent in charge of operations at the Garda national traffic bureau, GNTB, from 2008 to 2017. Many of the issues in question were highlighted in previous reports by the inspectorate, including in 2008, but those reports were not implemented because of the period of austerity.

Management was one factor in this situation. Education was another. There was no training or continuing professional development, CPD, from 2008 onwards in the areas covered by these two reports.

As to the suggestion that there was no education or awareness, there was an awareness that MAT checkpoints were a critical point of the lifesaver strategy.

There was no awareness that the recording of breath tests was a measurable outcome. We found that, across the ranks and associations and all the way up to the top, there was no awareness of the breath test tab on PULSE incidents, where breath tests were recorded. Consequently, there was no supervision of the data, no measurement and no attention paid to them across the divisions. It was not any part of any performance management, promotion or career advancement process. It simply sat there until the issue arose. I agree that this was poor management but that is the situation in which the organisation found itself at that particular time.