Dr. Mary Murphy:

I thank the Senators for their questions and their thoughts. It is interesting to get the feedback from them on some of the ideas I have outlined today.

I will start with the Acting Chairman’s comments. My response will probably touch on some of the other questions the Senators asked. The issue of a Border poll is problematic. I appreciate that for the nationalist political parties in Northern Ireland, the political aspiration for a united Ireland is obviously a very real and meaningful aspiration. However, conflating the Brexit referendum result with desire for a united Ireland is misleading because the two cannot be conflated. To some extent it can be unhelpful to talk consistently about the possibility of having a Border poll. It is very unhelpful to the process because it politicises the Brexit issue. In order to achieve some kind of solution to the Brexit issue, depoliticising the issue is imperative.

On the question of the Border poll, the Belfast Agreement, the Good Friday Agreement, makes it clear that there are only grounds for a Border poll in the event of justifiable evidence of support in terms of consent. Therefore, putting Irish unity on the table at this point distracts from the major issue, which is how to manage the Brexit process. That is not to say that the issue of the Border poll should not be on the agenda in the future.

However, the timing is particularly important here. Talking about a Border poll and the possibility of a united Ireland is something we should do but perhaps it is something we should do in the future, because the big problem is that when one starts talking about these issues, to which of course the unionist community is highly sensitive, it impacts on the degree of trust that exists between the two communities. If we start to damage that trust by bringing these issues to the table, it minimises the confidence that each side has in the other and undermines the possibility of achieving any sort of Brexit proposal or Brexit resolution.

While I can completely understand that the issue of Irish unification is part and parcel of the much broader debate about Northern Ireland's future, putting it on the table is unhelpful at a time when we are trying to find a Brexit proposal acceptable to both communities in Northern Ireland. That is very important. It is important for us on this side of the Border in how we approach the issue and it is also important for the parties in Northern Ireland in how they position themselves to reach some sort of Brexit proposal.

In response to Senator O'Reilly's questions, I have probably touched on some of the answers.

In terms of a Border poll, it is imperative to have cross-community support. Let us consider the referendum that followed the Good Friday Agreement. We do not know the following with any degree of certainty but we can surmise from the results of the referendum that it enjoyed the support of both communities - a strong majority of the nationalist community and a small unionist majority. That support lent enormous legitimacy to the document and allowed for its introduction. I suggest that the same sort of conditions are important for a Border poll. I agree with the Senator that the support of both communities is imperative and it should not simply be a number crunching exercise, given that the Belfast Agreement makes it clear that it is a straightforward 50% plus one referendum result. For the purpose of this discussion and the legitimacy of the process longer term, achieving a scenario whereby support for a united Ireland meets a certain level of support would be particularly important.

In terms of the re-installation of the institutions, and again nothing can be said with complete certainty, there are some signs that these institutions will be resurrected following the UK general election. It is something to which the key protagonists have hinted at over the past few weeks. On the extent to which Brexit will be top of the agenda if the institutions are re-instated, that is dependent on how the general election campaign plays out. I was surprised to note that the Brexit issue was placed very high on the agenda. If Brexit is high on the agenda for voters then it must be high on the agenda when the institutions meet. Also, the institutions, the political parties and key political figures in Northern Ireland may have been distracted by other issues. We have reached the point where Article 50 has been triggered, which has focused minds. The realities about the potential dire impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland has been realised much more fully by the political parties and the institutions.

In terms of mediating a process whereby the two communities in Northern Ireland could find agreement on how they might approach Brexit, the appointment of a mediator, facilitator or whatever terminology one uses is something that I proposed in my contribution. The process would have to involve both the Irish and UK Governments. Let us consider previous experiences of crises in Northern Ireland, whether it is the negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement, the Stormont House Agreement or the Hillsborough Agreement. It has often tended to be the case that they were facilitated by a neutral external individual. That type of framework has been used before. The British and Irish Governments are important stakeholders in the Brexit discussions. Therefore, they would have to be party to the process. In terms of bringing the communities in Northern Ireland together, and bringing nationalist and unionist representatives together in Northern Ireland, there may be merit in having a neutral facilitator of sorts to achieve it. As Senator O'Reilly said, there is broad agreement across the political party spectrum in Northern Ireland that the status quois preferable. I think that view is shared by all political parties.

I can appreciate the political sensitivities regarding the terminology and labelling of a possible special arrangement for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland, certainly from a European Union perspective, has always been special in terms of qualifying for Structural Funds from the 1980s onwards. Northern Ireland was given special dispensation because it did not meet the conditionality requirement. Due to the conflict situation, it was deemed appropriate for Northern Ireland to have elevated assistance from the European Union.

Sometimes the EU's role has been overstated in terms of the peace process. The European Union has played a subtle role by providing financial support through the PEACE programmes. It has played an interesting role in terms of Northern Ireland's EU task force that was created by the former European Commission President, Mr. Barroso. He brought together officials in the Northern Ireland Administration and officials in the European institutions as a means of assisting the Northern Ireland Administration to mature and engage more effectively with the European Union. Northern Ireland has always had a special status of sorts but the terminology is for others to decide. It is not completely out of kilter that Northern Ireland might again be treated as a special case in this instance.

In terms of strategies for this institution and other institutions in the Irish State, discussion by this special committee is exceptionally important. There is also scope for Members to reach out to their colleagues in Britain and Northern Ireland through institutions like the North-South Inter-Parliamentary Association and the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly. There is a need for broader discussion involving all of those actors and there is a need for re-assurance. That is why I talked about language being important in the presentation of ideas.

Senator Paul Daly rightly made the point that much emphasis has been placed on the economic context in which Brexit is unfolding. I agree with him. When one considers Northern Ireland's experience of the European Union, one sees that economic pragmatism has very much been a feature of how Northern Ireland approached the European Union, an approach that is likely to persist. The difference is that Brexit is much broader than just economics. Brexit touches on rights, sovereignty, identity and even the very unity of the United Kingdom. These are hugely sensitive issues. The extent to which liberal unionists might be persuaded to support a Border poll or a united Ireland is not necessarily something that we can entirely rely on at this point in time because the issues are of such immense sensitivity. They are also intangible issues.

The Senator asked about extremes in Northern Ireland and whether unionists, in particular, see merit in a more pragmatic approach to Brexit. There is a role for political leadership and a role for unionist political parties, in particular, to bring their voters with them. They have done so in the past and precedence has been set. Political parties on the unionist side of the house have been successful, even though it took time, in helping their voters to move away from some of the more unpalatable aspects of their past.

Senator Black mentioned trust and how it can be elevated. She used the interesting analogy of marriage. I will respond by using another analogy and say that marriages can be saved by marriage counselling. There is some context again within which an external input could be useful in helping parties achieve a position whereby trust can be rebuilt. In previous crises, trust was broken and it will likely be broken again in the future. We should not focus on the negatives of that situation. Trust can be regenerated and there are possibilities for such regeneration.

The Senator talked about the role of the Irish and British Governments. They are stakeholders and, therefore, have an important role to play. The extent to which their role is central is questionable, certainly in the lead up to talks about the re-installation of the institutions. All political parties expressed some problems with the fact that the talks were being chaired by the British Government.

I was asked what special status means. That is the million dollar question. To me, special status suggests that Northern Ireland may be treated differently from the rest of the UK. How it is framed is completely open to negotiation. I suggest that special status would mean the softest possible Brexit and that the Border between the North and South is not re-instated. Where that Border would then go is a different and much more sensitive matter.

I agree with the Senator's point that there is very little interest in the Northern Ireland issue on the part of the United Kingdom Government. Perhaps that is description is a little unfair. The British Government may not have given due consideration to the Northern Ireland issue as part of its approach to the Brexit strategy. There is no certainty regarding how all of this will play out.

One of the main criticisms of the process has been the lack of clarity and certainty and the serious ambiguity about what precisely Brexit means. This has been extremely problematic and continues to be problematic, even after the triggering of Article 50. The next nine to 12 months will be particularly important in giving us a sense of what precisely Brexit means from a UK perspective. The European Union has been a little more forthright than the United Kingdom in putting its particular preferences on the table. Certainty is extremely problematic, particularly for Northern Ireland and against a background in which trust between political parties in Northern Ireland and in the British Government is questionable.