Dr. Mary Murphy:

I thank the Acting Chairman and apologise for being unable to attend last week. I thank the committee for accommodating my contribution today. I am very grateful to have the opportunity to contribute to the work of the Seanad Special Committee on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.

In 2015 I was appointed by the Taoiseach to serve as a member of the Seanad reform working group which which was chaired by former Senator Maurice Manning. Its report was published in April 2015. It made a number of recommendations, including that the Seanad investigate and report on matters of public policy interest. The United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union is clearly one such matter. Brexit constitutes a serious challenge to the health of the Irish economy, stability on the island of Ireland and the future of the European Union. It is important and necessary that our political institutions engage in a robust consideration of how Ireland might best meet these immense challenges. I congratulate the Seanad on undertaking this exercise and hope I can make a constructive contribution to its work.

I will concentrate specifically on Northern Ireland and the challenges posed by Brexit. I stress that my emphasis is on process more than on outcomes. My emphasis is on the process of how we can frame a response from Northern Ireland, with Northern Ireland's agreement, which meets the best interests of Northern Ireland.

First, I will provide some important context. The Northern Ireland experience of peace building over a period of more than 20 years is considered, rightly or wrongly, to be a model of conflict resolution. The 1994 paramilitary ceasefires have largely held fast and power-sharing institutions have been operational. The conflict studies academic literature notes that these features of a conflict resolution process, an end to violence and the creation of shared institutions are but stages along the way to a final sustainable peace. The final stage of peace-building and consolidation involves a process called conflict transformation. This is the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition. This stage of conflict resolution is synonymous with the process of reconciliation. It means not just a de-escalation of violence but also a change in attitudes and a transformation of relationships at the core of the conflict. It is an expansive process that involves changes in persons, structures and relationships. The latter two changes in structures and relationships are deemed to be of particular significance in securing a permanent peace.

Northern Ireland has been successful in making structural institutional changes designed to accommodate and mediate difference. A crucial point, however, in the context of the current discussion is that this has not produced high levels of faith, trust and confidence between political parties and communities.

Residual issues, including flags, parades, language and legacy issues which have never been fully addressed now haunt the broader body politic. They continue to prevent agreement on resurrecting the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. A lack of trust permeates the political system in Northern Ireland and it manifests itself in intense competition between the two communal blocks and especially between political parties. Politics remains polarised. Within the academic literature this can be labelled a form of negative peace. Relations between the communities have certainly softened but mutual trust remains problematic. Fundamental disputes related to political aspirations linger. There are no visions of a shared future. If we look at the different positions adopted by Northern Ireland's political parties during the EU referendum campaign and more recently the different reactions from the communities to the referendum result, Brexit vividly highlights the absence of a shared vision for the future. The fact that Brexit challenges the UK constitutional status quo and may possibly lead to the fracturing of the United Kingdom also risks intensely politicising the Brexit issue in Northern Ireland. In addition, of course, Brexit poses acute economic challenges for Northern Ireland. In summary, Brexit has the potential to threaten not just economic stability but political and social stability too at what is a precarious time in Northern Ireland's post-conflict journey.

The question which then arises is, given the sensitivities and the risks, how Northern Ireland's best interests can be agreed, communicated and ultimately be protected. A close examination of Northern Ireland's experience of EU membership and of current positions reveals a number of important points and precedents. First, the European Union has a record of facilitating tailored financial and practical support for Northern Ireland in the context of its ongoing support for the peace process. Northern Ireland as a whole has been receptive to this support.

Second, the EU negotiating guidelines state the European Union is open to "flexible and imaginative solutions" in dealing with Brexit as it affects the island of Ireland. This implies that from the EU perspective, special arrangements for Northern Ireland may be possible but they are dependent on the United Kingdom providing flexible options.

Third, the political parties in Northern Ireland do share some common perspectives when it comes to achieving the softest possible Brexit. Parties of all hues, nationalist and unionist, do not want to see hard borders, want to protect the integrated electricity market, want to see the free movement of people and want to safeguard the agrifood business sector. There is some potential overlap in their positions. Where nationalists favour special status for Northern Ireland, unionists, including those who voted remain, wish to see continued co-operation with the Republic of Ireland, based on "common aims such as a seamless, frictionless border and maintenance of the common travel area". That is a quote from the DUP's election manifesto. Again, there is potential overlap.

Fourth, a major problem is that discussion of a special deal or special status or recognition of a unique circumstances for Northern Ireland evokes very different reactions, depending on one's constitutional outlook. Nationalists are strongly in favour of bespoke arrangements, but there are difficulties for the United Kingdom and unionists in terms of contemplating or facilitating such a deal. This is a challenge and a dilemma.

Fifth, a key challenge is to depoliticise the Brexit discussion in Northern Ireland. If we look at the region's experience of the European Union during the era of devolved power, there are some signs that this may be possible. The approach of the Northern Ireland power-sharing Administration to EU issues for which it had some devolved responsibility was largely based on pragmatism. A functional and utilitarian approach characterised Northern Ireland's engagement with the European Union during a prolonged period. The means that to allow a shared perspective on Brexit to be teased out and developed are primarily through the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly and other Belfast Agreement institutions. Reinstating the assembly and the Executive needs to be an immediate priority in the context of the ongoing Brexit process. The absence of an administration is paralysing.

What Northern Ireland needs is to take ownership of the Brexit issue and this requires courageous shared political leadership on how to meet the challenges associated with the UK exit from the European Union. A critical point is that the mood music is important. Creating the conditions to facilitate the establishment of trust between parties is paramount to ensuring the permanency of peace. Coaxing key political players back to the political table must not further agitate the negative peace backdrop. Where trust is absent there needs to be sensitivity and vigilance in the use of language and in the presentation of ideas. Undermining trust between the parties at this point risks damaging both how Northern Ireland fares vis-à-visBrexit and a fragile peace process.

There are some proposals. They may not be palatable to all, but they do provide some basis for discussion. For example, some bespoke arrangements have been tentatively proposed by colleagues in Queen's University, Belfast, namely, the European Economic Area, EEA, model. The Scottish Parliament has explored distinct solutions for Scotland and the Welsh Government has produced a position paper. The Northern Ireland Administration needs to do likewise. The European Union's openness to flexible and imaginative solutions provides a place for exploring creative ways of meeting the interests of both nationalists and unionists. If the Northern Ireland authorities can produce an agreed position, whatever that might be, the strength and legitimacy of that position would make it difficult for others, including the UK Government and the European Union, to resist or oppose such proposals. Political leaders in the European Union and the United Kingdom would find it hard to overlook or ignore a Northern Ireland position which has been jointly crafted and agreed by all political persuasions. Admittedly this is a very challenging and ambitious proposal. However, if we look back at Northern Ireland's experience over 20 years or so in terms of the existence of the devolved capacity, those involved have, at times of crisis, reached out. They have engaged the support of the British and Irish Governments. They have looked to the European Union for support. If we look at how the Scottish example has been mediating this particular Brexit issue, it has engaged explicitly and frequently with a high-level external group of experts. The civic dialogue in the Republic of Ireland may be something that can be replicated in Northern Ireland. Perhaps one of the more ambitious proposals which I tentatively suggest is that some intermediate or neutral facilitator could be used to mediate and facilitate the different positions proposed by nationalists and unionists in terms of providing an agreed Northern Ireland position to which it would be difficult to object.

A period of negative peace is a very vulnerable point in any peace process. Brexit has the potential to upset the current delicate equilibrium in Northern Ireland by endangering political, social and economic stability there. However, if the Brexit challenge can be approached with some degree of internal unity against a backdrop which is sensitive to the complex dynamics at play for both communities, it may also present one of the biggest opportunities for real political progress and longer term stability. It may actually be an important step in building trust and cementing the process of conflict transformation. Peace is fragile. Institutions are fragile and building trust is challenging. Our approach to Brexit on this side of the Border should be acutely attuned to all of this. The process is as important as the outcome in achieving the best interests of all.