Mr. Eamon Gilmore:

If I am not sufficiently brief, please remind me. The Chairman asked whether there would be opportunities for trade. One of the big rules in trade is that one should do the most trade with one's nearest neighbours. Mr. Bertie Ahern said that to replace 5% of trade with the EU the UK would have to make up 20% of trade with the commonwealth. I do not have a figure for the amount we would have to make up in trade with the rest of the world to make up for what we might lose in trade with the UK, but I think it would be quite substantial. The global opportunities for us lie probably more in the area of investment than trade and the fact that Ireland will be the sole English-speaking member state of the European Union will be an attraction for investment. The further one goes from this Continent, the more people see Europe as Europe, rather than its individual states. Very often they do not make a distinction between who is in or out of the European Union until they have to make a decision based on whether to invest in a state with 60 million people or one with access to a market of 500 million. There will be advantages for us in this area.

Senators Nash and Craughwell asked about another referendum in the UK, but I do not think there will be one. They have made their bed in this respect and I do not see any political movement to hold another referendum. The situation may change but it is not the case at the moment. Another question was on the prospect of a referendum here. We might not be the only country to ratify by referendum and the Netherlands held a referendum on the association agreement with Ukraine. I can foresee a situation where the legal advice to the Government would be that, on balance, a referendum was not required but I can also see that option being challenged in the courts and we do not know what the outcome of that would be. The Crotty judgment did not turn on the Single European Act itself but on the implications of the Single European Act for foreign policy. There is probably no bigger implication for Irish foreign policy than Brexit, particularly in respect of Northern Ireland, and it greatly outweighs other changes to European treaties on which we have held referenda. The decision to hold a referendum might be required by a decision of the Supreme Court after the withdrawal agreement is concluded and an attempt made to ratify it.

I am simply raising the question that if that is the scenario we are facing into, might it not be better now to make a conscious political decision to say that when the final agreement is made we will have a referendum on it and to have the advantage that would give in strengthening the hand of Government in the negotiation process and at keeping the Irish dimension at the centre of attention? It is something that requires some discussion and consideration and it may well be something on which members may wish to reflect before they make a report. I hope that answers Senator Paul Daly's question. Nobody wants a prolonged period of uncertainty. That is not in anybody's interest but none of us can predict what the courts may decide, nor can we predict what other states might decide. We have seen already that the Netherlands has a trade stake in this. We saw what happened in Belgium in respect of the Canadian free trade agreement. Events can happen in other states that may influence it as well.

Senator Nash asked about the optimum arrangement in respect of a hard Border. This may also address some of the points raised by Senator Black. Were the United Kingdom to leave the Single Market and the customs union, there would have to be customs control but it might not necessarily be on the island. If we look at the politics of this in the UK, this is largely an English-driven agenda. It would not be necessarily a big deal not to have a customs Border between the two parts of Ireland - Northern Ireland has a population of less than 2 million - but what I can envisage is that the hard border is on the neighbouring island. It is when one crosses the water that one would have a customs border, as we did during the period of the Troubles, for example. When one was travelling through UK airports one went into a channel for passengers from Ireland where they checked one's passport to see who one was and so on. They could do the same in respect of goods traffic. Border checks do not have to take place on the actual physical Border. They can take place when a boat docks in Stranraer, Liverpool or Holyhead or when goods are being transported through the island of the UK. That is probably a more likely scenario.

There is probably a Northern Ireland dimension that needs to be considered here, particularly by people in Northern Ireland who consider themselves British and part of that whole arrangement, in that they may well be faced with a form of control getting on and off the island of Britain that might not be called a Border in respect of the actual transportation between, say, Belfast and Glasgow but in reality could be. That is probably the more likely scenario that in effect would avoid a hard Border on the island. None of us want to go back to that. I remember the time spent going through Aughnacloy to Donegal, for example, at different times. That is probably the more likely scenario.

Senator O'Reilly asked if I believed we will achieve the common travel area. I do. The common travel area predated our membership of the European Union. We need to think about what we mean by the common travel area. I travelled to London yesterday on a flight from Dublin. I got off in London City Airport. I walked right through the airport. There was no check of passports; the common travel area. I came back to Dublin this morning and joined the queue to have my passport checked. On this side of the water we need to give some thought as to what we mean by the common travel area. We cannot claim that we have a common travel area if we insist on checking the passports of people travelling from the UK when they are not doing the same on the other side.

I am not as confident, however, in respect of the free trade arrangement. The reality is that if the UK leaves the Single Market or the customs union, we are part of the common European Union trade market arrangement. Because of the unique relationship between Ireland and Britain, as it is called in the documentation, that trade issue will have to be addressed. The likely situation is that we will be expected to be part of the EU 27 common arrangement with the UK but that will give rise to particular disadvantages for Irish business in respect of its trade with the UK. That is where the idea of the Brexit trade adjustment fund would kick in. As for how it would operate, the EU operates many different types of funds of this kind to address particular problems that arise in the trading relationship and free movement and to address particular issues of disadvantage. There is no reason a fund of this kind could not exist where it could not be measured by reference to the historic pattern of trade between the two islands and measured also in respect of the levels of tariffs that are applied. It would be then an issue for different industries or sectors to respond to it.

Senator Craughwell asked about the Good Friday Agreement. As I said earlier, it is not possible to reconcile a hard Brexit with the Good Friday Agreement. I cannot see how the UK can fulfil its commitments to the Good Friday Agreement and have a hard Brexit. If we consider the practical issues, for example, the agriculture sector, the work InterTrade Ireland does and areas where there is at least some level of cross-Border activity, it is all based on the presumption that the rules are common and that the Common Agricultural Policy applies both North and South. If we have a situation where, for example, farmers in this part of Ireland are in receipt of some form of EU transfers or supports, farmers in Northern Ireland will not benefit from that. Will Westminster replace that in some way? What is the common issue on the agenda for North-South Ministerial Council meetings? The same applies to other areas such as fisheries and so on where a common policy applies. The removal of the UK from the EU removes those areas of common discussion and common policy which render cross-Border issues less relevant.

On the issue of a united Ireland raised by Senator Black, I would like to see a united Ireland. I believe I share that aspiration probably with most people in this country. We have to deal with that issue with a great deal of care. It cannot be simply dealt with by way of having a Border poll or a head count. The reality is that many people on this island identify themselves as British, and that British identity will need to be protected and guaranteed within a united Ireland context. We have to talk about what that means in terms of the likely institutions that might be established in a united Ireland situation. We also have to examine areas where there is harmonisation. That discussion should take place. We need to talk about how that would work in practice. In particular, we need to talk with people on the island who do not share that aspiration because it needs to be an agreed situation.

I was going great until Senator Mark Daly spoke; everybody was agreeing with everybody. I disagree with Senator Daly on several issues. I disagree with his representation of Federica Mogherini. She is doing an outstanding job as the European Union's High Representative on foreign policy. If the Senator checks her record over her period in office, it has been outstanding and, I might add, exhausting.

Reference was made to humanitarian aid. I do not agree with the suggestion the European Union is not doing enough. It is the greatest contributor of humanitarian aid in the world. In particular, it is the greatest contributor of humanitarian aid in dealing with the crisis in Syria.

I never said we should abandon our neutrality and reject the suggestion I did. What I am saying is that if we want to maintain our policy of neutrality and want it to mean something, we need to ensure the foreign policy of the European Union is made at the Foreign Affairs Council rather than NATO. My fear stems from the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. It is already a major part of NATO where proceedings will become far more the focus of its foreign policy agenda rather than the European Union. Given that the majority of other member states of the European Union are also members of NATO, there is a danger European policy-making in respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will shift even more towards NATO than is the case. That would not be in our interests because we are not a member. We are a member of the Foreign Affairs Council.

Let us consider the issues that have to be addressed. Probably the greatest issue in Europe in this area is the relationship with Russia. It is critical that this relationship and the associated policy be addressed at the Foreign Affairs Council. It is vital that the place where decisions are made on the relationship of the European Union with neighbouring countries, including in respect of issues in the Middle East and Africa, is the Foreign Affairs Council where Ireland has punched above its weight in the making of foreign policy, peacekeeping activity, the provision of development assistance and so on. It is probably fair to say there has been a reluctance to engage on security and defence issues. Again, this is due to our position on neutrality, but we will have to be more active in policy-making. This is not about abandoning our neutrality or becoming part of a military alliance. However, in the context of the making of security and defence policy, we will have to take a more active interest in and engage on the matter. If we do not ensure these decisions are made where the neutral countries are present – Ireland is not the only neutral country – the reality is that the centre of gravity on these issues will shift further down the road to NATO headquarters.