Gerard Craughwell (Independent) | Oireachtas source

I thank the witnesses for attending. My concern with respect to Brexit is in finding out what solutions the witnesses may be able to offer. The problems associated with Brexit have been well rehearsed in the public domain and the discussion appears to be focused on whether it will be a hard or soft Brexit. In my view, it will be a somewhat disorganised process in which some solutions may be negotiated at an early date, while it may prove very difficult to negotiate solutions in other areas. My focus, therefore, is on what solutions the witnesses are in a position to offer to the committee or the Government.

Does the Central Bank have all the expertise it requires or does it need to employ or acquire additional expertise in specific areas? If additional expertise is required, has the Central Bank sought Government approval to employ additional staff and, if so, what has been the Government's response?

The areas highlighted by the witnesses include materials manufacturing, agrifood and tourism. Agrifood and tourism will be two key areas in terms of the downside of Brexit. Has the Central Bank modelled different scenarios and solutions to the problems that will arise based on certain outcomes? If so, does it have a best and worst case scenario, particularly in agrifood and tourism?

Reference was made to the possibility of a 30% fall in exports to the United Kingdom, which is a significant figure by any measure. Michel Barnier and various other people to whom we spoke in Brussels indicated that the Commission would take a favourable view of requests for support for market diversification activities and the construction, if one likes, of better infrastructure with European Union partners, for example, the establishment in the south east, perhaps in Waterford, of a major port that would provide a direct link to Europe, thereby precluding the need for goods and people to traverse the United Kingdom. Has the Central Bank examined this possibility, including construction costs and the savings that would be achieved in respect of tariffs levied on entering and departing Britain?

I am particularly concerned by the statement that exports could decline by 4% overall. The documentation is very clear in this regard. However, the figure masks a very serious impact on companies that are almost married, as it were, to the UK market. We have been somewhat lethargic in developing markets in countries whose languages we do not speak. England has always been a safe bet. Has the Central Bank explored this issue? Several Irish suppliers in the agrifood sector are recognised worldwide. However, we also have many small indigenous companies, including one-man and two-man operations in certain niche areas, which export solely to the United Kingdom. A 30% decline in trade with Britain would effectively knock these companies out of business. EU rules limit the supports that can be provided to such companies. Has the Central Bank examined which rules need to be relaxed to provide the supports that would be needed during a transition period?

I am more interested in solutions than problems because the latter have been so well rehearsed that the dogs in the street are barking about Brexit. That discussion does not give us an idea as to where we are likely to go and the Central Bank appears to be the only organisation that is focused on the impact of Brexit on the entire economy, sector by sector.

I thank the witnesses for their time. I am sorry for throwing all these questions at them