Ms Raphaëlle Faure:

I thank the committee for inviting me. I sit in London at the heart of Brexit working for a development think-tank. Members' peers in the UK Parliament are also trying to get their heads around what Brexit will mean for development policy.

Article 50 was triggered approximately two weeks ago, some nine months after the referendum. The two-year process for the UK to exit is starting, but at this stage there are more questions than answers. It remains unclear what the implications will be on EU development policy and the associated budgets. Brexit will impact on these issues and change the balance of power within the EU, given that a major member is leaving. Perhaps there are opportunities that Ireland can grasp to be more influential on the EU scene.

Brexit will impact on EU development policy and budgets in three main ways, the first of which is the geographical allocation of aid. Within the EU, the UK had a strong influence on choosing which countries received money. The UK's former colonies and Commonwealth countries benefited, so a question arises over how their interests will be represented once the UK leaves. It is worth noting that more than half of the countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific group are members of the Commonwealth.

The EU may now decide to focus less of its money on these countries and other member states, such as France, will have a greater voice in decisions. For example, it could choose to push more aid towards francophone countries. However, this would most likely be counterbalanced by important donors like Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. Newer member states like Poland and the Czech Republic are playing a greater part in EU development policy, presenting another possible counterbalance to France's interests.

Second, there is the question of the future relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific, ACP, group. The committee may know that the Cotonou Agreement, which is the framework under which that relationship is governed, will expire in 2020 and negotiations on a future agreement are about to start. The ACP is a heterogeneous group and it is unlikely that the next agreement will be similar to the current one. Without the UK's influence and involvement in the discussions, questions arise over how the interests of some of the anglophone African and Caribbean states will be reflected.

Brexit will have a major impact on how policy making is done in the EU. The UK was a strong, welcome, progressive and influential voice on development. Other member states looked up to it and the Department for International Development, DFID, and how they undertook aid policy. Now that they are out, other member states will push their own agendas and some issues may lose traction. The UK was vocal on meeting the 0.7% aid-to-GNI target, women and girl's rights, keeping the focus of aid on poverty eradication, having a strong results framework for measuring the impact of EU aid and using cash transfers in humanitarian crises. These issues may lose traction if no other member state takes them on. Perhaps this is an area that the Irish Government, and the committee in terms of its influence on the Government, might wish to consider.

Brexit opens up a number of opportunities. The UK has repeatedly opposed or put the brakes on what is called joint programming. Perhaps there will be more opportunities for this to happen in future. Joint programming involves donors agreeing a single strategy in a recipient country so that there is greater coherence between donors and developing countries have fewer donors to handle, that is, they speak to one person.

Third, Brexit will have a major impact on the budget. The UK contributes approximately £1.3 billion, or 15% of the EU's aid budget. It means that there could be a 15% decrease in the budget for 2019 or remaining member states could choose to fill the gap by increasing their own contributions. The UK spends approximately one third of its aid through the European Development Fund, EDF, which is the mechanism for spending money in ACP states, and £83 million via EU trust funds to tackle the root causes of migration. It is a shareholder in the European Investment Bank, EIB, which provides loans to developing countries, and supplies one fifth of the EU's humanitarian budget. These figures are worth bearing in mind.

What might a future relationship between the EU and UK look like? It is possible for the UK to continue contributing. Since the EU trust funds are open to all international donors, the UK can channel funding through these. It has been announced that the EIB will change its rules to allow the UK to remain a shareholder. If the EDF remains off budget, there may be scope for the UK to continue channelling money through it, but it is not clear whether the EDF will remain off budget.

From where I sit in London and given the tension, the atmosphere and the attacks by the press on aid and the EU, it is hard to believe that the UK Government will want to continue spending money through the EU even if it is the best possible option. It is a toxic affair in the UK. It is likely that the UK Government will choose to redirect that money through bilateral channels and other multilateral channels, for example, the World Bank.

Where can Ireland play a more influential role in the EU as a result of Brexit? It could choose to channel more of its aid through the EU. A report of an OECD DAC peer review of the Irish Aid programme was published in 2014.

It found its multilateral spending could be more strategic as much of the aid was going to UN agencies which shared few priorities with the Irish Aid programme. Perhaps channelling more money through the European Union might be a way to offset the cuts as a result of the United Kingdom leaving. It might be a way to influence other member states to increase their funding through the European Union.

Ireland could push for maintaining a focus on Anglophone developing countries which stand to lose out as a result of Brexit and which are among Ireland’s priority partners. Several processes are under way such as the Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations, the post-Cotonou agreement and the adoption of the new EU development consensus, on which Ireland could have an influence. Ireland could build on its existing strengths in combating hunger and under-nutrition and increasing resilience, for which it is renowned. During its EU Presidency the Irish Government made good advances on these issues. It could work with member states which share similar interests such as Italy to make a more influential push in the EU forum. Ireland is recognised for having a strong whole-of-government approach and good policy coherence on the issues of hunger and resilience. It could share some of the lessons learned with the European Union and other member states.

Ireland could carve out a niche for itself in building on its domestic experience. It could be more influential in peaceful conflict resolution processes such as in helping design processes and providing advice along the way. It is already active in this area through the EU trust fund for Colombia which supports the peace process. Migration is another such area.

It is interesting to note that the Minister of State's portfolio includes the diaspora and international development. Useful lessons for developing countries could be shared on matters such as sending remittances, sharing knowledge and skills back home, contributing to the development of the country of origin, harnessing the global diaspora network and addressing barriers to a return. Fiscal consolidation and economic recovery in response to shocks is another area in which Ireland could share its experiences. Many of its partner countries have economies which rely heavily on commodities and are subject to external shocks and volatile markets. Ireland could share lessons from its experiences in dealing with the financial and banking crisis.

Ireland may want to push for the achievement of the 0.7% aid to GNI target. If so and if it wants to be a credible vocal player, it will need to increase its level from 0.32% in 2015.

Dublin could become a major civil society hub. London is currently a hub for many NGOs which might want to relocate in order that their staff could continue to work without needing a visa and access EU funding. Dublin is an alternative with several advantages such as the fact that its working language is English, that it is eligible for EU funding and cheaper than London. Being such a hub would help to influence policy-making and international decisions, as well as having a core of expertise knowledge.