Professor Alan Ahearne:

Well, look at the aggregate numbers. I mean, if NAMA was about to make or expected to make a profit of €20 billion, or surplus - it's not a profit-making institution - a surplus of €20 billion, then you might have an argument there. You might say, "Well, they clearly underpaid these banks for these assets. Look at the huge profits or surplus they are about to make." And, by the way, most of the arguments at the time were not that the fears, concerns that NAMA was going to underpay, but they would overpay. But my understanding - and you've had NAMA in front of you - is that they more or less expected to break even or that they would make a small surplus. That would suggest to me that they more or less got the pricing right, that the value they paid was the value of the loans and, therefore, what happened is that the banks simply were forced to face up to what was reality.