Ciarán Lynch (Cork South Central, Labour) | Oireachtas source

But with the ... NAMA's testimony to this inquiry in terms of how loans were actually being funded was, if I could give an example, a person would maybe, from the get-go, at the very, very first development, would maybe get a loan-to-value situation where they might have to come up with 10% or 20% or 30% of the cash. But, because we were in an escalating and hyper property inflated environment, that, by the time they moved to the next development, the value of the initial development had exceeded the loan-to-value and probably was in high positive equity, therefore that positive equity could be used as a deposit on the next development, which meant that there was no cash payment on the next loan. What was there was a securitisation on what we subsequently found out was an overvalued development. And this became compounded where a very small number of lenders with your institution found themselves getting massive cash loans, or getting massive loans, over a period of time, to accumulate more developments without ever spending a single cent in deposit terms. I mean, this is the type of concentrations we're talking about. And, when Anglo finally crashed, what we saw on its loan book was a very, very small number of people with huge debt exposure. Was that ever a consideration inside in the bank that there is something here that we need to be looking at?