Mr. Matt Moran:

Well, I think from the onset of the crisis, Deputy, in August-September, there was an enormous level of work undertaken in the bank to protect liquidity and it's a very difficult balancing act that a bank undertakes because any show or sign of weakness can cause, actually, the weakness to feed off itself and result in an issue. So the bank worked very significantly to manage liquidity in the period. There were a number of issues, I think, which are worth highlighting. Firstly, the bank was a monoline bank and businesses that are focused, niche players tend to do very well in strong economic environments. Businesses that are focused, niche players, on the other hand, tend to do less well when economies are hit. Now, I don't think anybody foresaw the scale of crisis that was going to come but that was a factor that the bank had to handle.

Secondly, the bank was single-A rated and, over time, it became de factonecessary to have a double-A rating to play in the markets. Thirdly, we had a very particular issue in respect of the CFD holding in the bank and that manifested itself and became known to me towards the end of 200. But I think the fact that that position was held by so many international counterparties, the market became aware of that and that undoubtedly, in my view, had an impact on liquidity within the bank.