Mr. Michael Walsh:

By definition, the board was fully aware of these. The board would have commissioned the KPMG Project Harmony vendor due diligence. The board, obviously, would have reviewed that at the time and, indeed, so would the Central Bank and everybody else. Those reports are prepared, as you know, because you want to give a warts-and-all picture of the institution that you are seeking to sell. You know, at that point in time, there was no indication whatsoever of serious concern by any potential buyer in relation to the structure of the society or the model it was actually pursuing.

I think you make the point in relation to high LTVs. I think what you need to recognise is that the nature of the loans were very short in duration in many cases and, as a result of that, they were there with a view to getting planning permission or whatever kind of short-term refinement and that, in itself, enhanced the value of the actual loan. There was proper, or, when I say "proper", there was a detailed review done of the loan books, I think in, probably, kind of, November 2008, before the real collapse, I suppose, took place in 2010. But in 2008, I think it showed that the average LTV across the book was 80% and, you know, if you couple that 80% with the 24% absorption capability the society actually had, the society was actually in an extraordinarily resilient position if it hadn't been for the absolutely phenomenal decline in prices in 2009 and 2010.