Mr. Mike Aynsley:

I think I refer ... there is a document, I don't know exactly where it is, which I found quite useful in, sort of, understanding this which is... I only had a photograph of it on my phone so I couldn't print it out to bring in so I had to draw this but I think it's useful just thinking about the timing of the losses in the banks. And, of course, you know, Anglo took the early hit of €4 billion in the first half of 2009. By the end of 2010, they had taken €18 billion and then another €17.3 billion so €29.3 billion, so Anglo really did the work on the asset portfolio, understanding where the destruction in value was and took those hits up front. This report I'm referring to is labelled ... it's from the guarantee to bailout, looking at the cost of the capitalisation of the banks and the reference is Honohan, 2012. And from that, you know, the other banks really... Bank of Ireland did not take a €5.2 billion hit until March 2011 when they did PCAR and AIB didn't take a hit until March 2011 of €13.3 billion so whilst you could look in those early days and, you know, I had these discussions early on with the Department of Finance about the size of the hits we were taking and saying "Well, it sort of doesn't make sense to me what's happening in AIB because, given their activity, their involvement in the same markets over the same period of time, there should have been a direct read-across from what we knew about their portfolios." And that wasn't coming through in these numbers; that didn't come through until a lot later in those banks