Mr. John Dunne:

My recollection is slightly different to Mr. Begg's. There had been discussion, both in the regulator and, to my recollection, in the bank, about possibilities as the situation worsened. And there was a meeting of the regulator - I believe it was around about 16 September - when various options were discussed, if the deteriorating situation went over the cliff and became, you know, an Armageddon-type situation. And the issue of a guarantee, while not overly stated ... overtly stated, was implicitly contained as a result of that meeting. It was one of the things that was talked about and I think there was some discussion in one of the bank meetings and, as David recalls - correctly, in my view, too - there were a whole series of meetings which ran into one to another. But I think there was some discussion of options. Now, there was no finite ... to my recollection, there was no finite decisions, whatever, taken. I do recall also being phoned, I'm pretty sure, by the chairman of the regulator, Mr. Farrell - it could have been Mr. Neary but I think it was Mr. Farrell - on the day or the day before ... it must have been the day, saying that they'd been called to the meeting and that the sort of options that had been talked about would inevitably come up and had they my authority ... I understood there were calls being made to all the members of the authority, but had they my authority to pursue that line in whatever they felt was most appropriate in the circumstances. So the following day, when I read it in the newspapers, I was somewhat surprised but I wasn't completely surprised because I was aware of all these other issues. And subsequent to that, we had a briefing from Mr. Farrell and Mr. Neary and they indicated that having regard to all of the issues involved, they had come to the conclusion that the guarantee was the appropriate mechanism and they had so advised the Government.