Mr. Paul Gallagher:

Yes. I suppose there's two things to bear in mind. Firstly, the guarantee did provide very significant conditions with regard to the commercial activities of the bank and for the public interest directors. And of course that ensured that other banks didn't regard - that didn't need help - didn't regard the guarantees as desirable. You heard evidence that various other banks were looking to be included in it, but the conditions were tough and they were stringent, which made it non-attractive.

Secondly, the issue as presented was that before the markets opened you had to have a solution. Thirdly, people talk about the €64 billion hole but, as the committee has heard, that no matter what investigation had been done by the banks, wouldn't have been apparent on 30 September. The extent of the losses increased over time, as I think some of the witnesses have said, because you not only had the liquidity issue but you had the great recession which continued far longer. The market disappeared. You then had the valuations in NAMA. And you had a series of attempts to get to the bottom of the hole but the hole was deepening the whole time. I think Mr. Corrigan graphically described it as a "falling knife". So at a point in time that wasn't the deficit.