Ms Cathy Herbert:

I don't know because I wasn't involved in those discussions. He came in in May. It may have been something that he was pushing for - I don't know - but very soon after the guarantee decision was taken, we had the ... PwC went into the banks and then the appointment of Jones Lang as well at a later stage to look at what they ... to look again at their analysis. He was, I now know, concerned ... very concerned about Anglo and the growth in it and it was a big bank and that was the one ... that was the institution ... it and Irish Nationwide were the institutions that were most exposed. And I think that that might have been why he ... I think ... my understanding from discussions we had - and I can't remember chapter and verse on it - was that that probably was what was behind his idea of nationalising Anglo. It was to distinguish ... to draw a distinction between this bank and other banks. I think he wanted to, for the reputation of the financial institutions, to say, "Okay, so these banks are bad and this is how we're going to deal with them but these are okay." But of course at that stage he didn't have the benefit of knowing exactly how bad the other banks were, all our banks were.