Mr. Brian Cowen:

I don't know the answer to that. I mean, what I'd say to you is you'd only take on a nationalisation if you had to take it on. That would be my view. You don't just decide, "We'll just ...let's just take on ... let's take over an institution." You'd take it on if you had to take it on. And by the time it came to us when we took it on we had no other option but to take it on.

The question then is back to your view of the nationalisation. Do you want to take this on to your books straight away without looking at it further, considering it further? Or do you want ... and if, for example, there hadn't been these other issues that arose that drove the nationalisation, made it inevitable, the question was arising, what was the percentage that we needed to take for any recapitalisation money we were putting in? Now, clearly it was after ... it went totally way beyond where anyone was at subsequent to that, and clearly a nationalisation became obvious, and it became obvious with others as well. I mean, AIB, who had been in on the night saying, "You better do something with Bank X." I mean we had to something with them which was quite significant too and they didn't seem to know, obviously, the position they were in themselves, quite apart from giving opinions about everyone else.

So my view, if you want my view of what it's worth, is you only nationalise a bank where you have to nationalise a bank. That's my position. You don't take on that asset and liabilities willy-nilly. You need to have a pretty considered position on it. That night I didn't think it was appropriate, because I was afraid that if ... you could look at it either way, but I was afraid that it would indicate further nationalisations on the way pretty quickly. And then you were in a very difficult situation, in my opinion.