Mr. Brian Cowen:

Well, I think there's no doubt that whilst the NAMA process was thorough, it was time consuming and the longer it took to get to the bottom of all this, the more difficult it was made for us, as you say, to be able to put out there a consistent message. But part of our problem too was that there wasn't a market out there and, therefore, the valuation issue was becoming a moving feast as far as I could see. It didn't make it any easier. It was time consuming anyway but that was another complication and complexity that, again, by definition, didn't feed confidence into the system. While I think there was a recognition that Ireland was being genuinely ... rather than trying to hide the issues inside in bank balance sheets, we were trying to extricate out of bank balance sheets what the situation was.

And ultimately, by the time we set up NAMA, got that work in place, had the statements in banking, then deal with the Greek situation, the impact that had on our own bond market, I mean, there was an awful lot happening and an awful lot going against us so that by the time we did finally get to where we wanted to get to, we were ... we were ... again our room for manoeuvre was restricted again so that our ... to be honest with you, our honesty in getting it out there was militating against us in terms of improving sentiment.