Mr. Brian Cowen:

Yes, sorry, yes, hold it there now. Yes, well, in relation to this, I mean, the question of liquidity risks and interventions coming into play were being discussed at the ECOFIN, at the Eurogroup, we were having our own issues coming up nationally. This document was sent over to the Department to tell us what their assessment of the situation was. I can see down at the bottom "Contingency Planning Arrangements":

The Central Bank and Financial Regulator continue to liaise with the Irish banks closely at CEO level and are monitoring the position very closely. The banks in turn are working intensively to implement contingency arrangements to meet their liquidity requirements.

So that, if you like, was an updating by those who were active in this field, dealing with the banks, telling us where things were at and we were ... obviously, they would be liaising with our people, Kevin Cardiff, who would keep me informed as things were developing. I didn't have to set up another separate emergency arrangement. And it wasn't defined as "an emergency arrangement", by the way, it was a question of them liaising, as they say, with the Irish banks at CEO level closely - the regulator and the Central Bank. This is where the interface with the banking system took place. They were the people who were dealing with it. They were the people who had the micro-prudential responsibility. The financial stability issues were with the Central Bank. Our people were being kept informed as to what their ... what were they doing to make sure the Irish banks, at CEO level, were working closely with them to maintain liquidity in the system. And if we hadn't got to crisis situations at that ... I mean, there was a tightening of - this happened over a period of 12 or more months - there was a tightening of liquidity, a reaction that was taking place as a result of the subprime issue in the States becoming more obvious, having wider second-round effects, etc.