Mr. William Beausang:

What ... well, I mean, I think it's ... it's quite clear that the ... given the systemic nature of the crisis that we were facing - and I think it's borne out in, certainly, the Nyberg report and the Honohan report - that allowing an institution to fail in those circumstances would have been catastrophic. So ... obviously, in our planning we had looked, at different times, at the whole issue of winding down of a financial institution, at a special resolution ... a special resolution regime for the banks. What we concluded was that there was huge, you know, technical, legal, policy, potentially constitutional difficulties in putting such a regime in place. But, in any event, I think it's very important to make the point that, you know, the SS ... the SRR that's now in place - the Credit Institutions (Resolution) Act - it's explicitly set up on the basis that the resolution powers only ... only play out - are only available to be implemented - in a situation where the decision has been taken not to wind down the bank. So the special resolution regime that we have from 2011 is explicit that the resolution powers - things like bridge banks, the transfer of liabilities and special manager and all that - those things only happen if the decision is made that the bank shouldn't be subject to an orderly wind-down. So, I mean, that's important to, kind of, feed in to the discussion on the special resolution regime and proposals for orderly wind-down.