Mr. Kevin Cardiff:

I don't know if it made much difference to the end number, Deputy, but we didn't ... AIB, in particular, was very slow on its asset disposals. They really, really liked their Polish subsidiary and they didn't want to sell it. Actually, it was probably a much better bank, as it turns out, than the head office was, so that's understandable - other subsidiaries too. So they ... we thought ... but, again, this is ... as I said, you don't know until the very end, until someone turns over the cards, you don't know exactly what cards people were playing. But we thought that they were going much too slow on that. I recall a quite tough conversation in which AIB said, ''Look, you've always been [I've always been] negative on the Polish subsidiary'', and I said, ''No, I think the Polish subsidiary is great. The problem is I'm negative on AIB and you need to sell the Polish subsidiary to support AIB''. It was the jewel in the crown, naturally they didn't want to get rid of it. But there were other subsidiaries too, other asset disposals they could do. In ... in Bank of Ireland, at least they thought ... they started thinking quite quickly about their UK mortgage book. I mean, it's evident, from that document you just gave me last night, they were at least thinking "Well, here we have this mortgage book if we could sell that we would ... that would generate capital also". So we had a sense that the co-operation could have been better. We pushed, eventually it happened. Had we been able ... had we had the advantage of time, that Polish asset could probably have been sold three days - two or three years later for a good deal more. But we didn't have that advantage.