Mr. William Beausang:

Well, I mean, at the time I joined the Department in 2005, I mean, obviously there'd been a lot of discussion, debate and controversy about what the structures should be and, you know, in terms of the different options that were there - a stand-alone regulator or a regulator that would report into a single board - and then we came ... we came to the hybrid model that ultimately was put in place under the legislation. But, I mean, wouldn't necessarily accept what perhaps other people have reflected that there was some inherent flaw in the structure itself which contributed hugely to the difficulties of ... the major difficulties that arose in due course. I mean, there's no ... there's no analysis or research which says that one form of structure ... one form of regulatory structure is better than another. I mean in some countries they might have a stand-alone regulator, in others they might have a regulator that's wholly integrated into their Central Bank. There's pros and cons to both, so that I wouldn't ... I wouldn't necessarily accept the analysis that there was something inherently flawed in the structure. Although, I mean, I would defer obviously to the evidence given by other-----