Mr. Derek Moran:

I think I touched on ... sorry, excuse me, a good amount of this already, Chairman. I suppose at one level, there was that point in the late 1990s where the emphasis of policy perhaps moved. The separation of monetary policy going to the ECB and fiscal policy becoming a ... very much the central consideration for governments. The model that Professor FitzGerald was using, which is HERMES model, we would have used as well, which didn't have the capacity within it, you know, and there was, as I say, this ... this sense of the bank and the regulator were doing their jobs and all the external commentary sort of validated that, you know. Now, I ... I mean, I think it is a weakness in the Department that the fiscal piece and ... and the ... the monetary piece, or the credit piece, weren't joined together adequately, but I think some of it is based on this view that the job over here was being done and our job was to concentrate on this piece and that was mistaken. And we are ... you know, and I'll go back to COSMO, the unfortunate COSMO, you know, we are, you know, kind of ... having that capacity, using the structures within the Department where the chief economist is involved and chairs, for example, our housing and construction group, which involves people across the Department, you know, in a much horizontal way, improving some of the risk function in a way that we can actually get the risk function to challenge people and add the pieces together and come back to it. So, I think we've become much better at the horizontal pieces and joining those together and it's probably one of the important things that we've learned out of the crisis.