Mr. John Moran:

With the passage of time, I couldn't give you the exact dates but I do recall over the course of the period from the signing of the bailout to, I guess, the end of March, which is when the peak hour was in 2011. What we did ... which at the time I was at the Central Bank ... was we tried to take all of the banking system and in a sense make sense out of it, not necessarily just because of historical legal entities, but looking at what the system needed in terms of size, what it needed in terms of type of lending, and where were the potential for that to occur. There had been up to that point I think, certainly an understanding that the mission that had been given for Anglo's management team - property more so than the IBS, I don't know anything about that - was that they should try and do what, effectively, Jeremy and the team had done at PTSB very successfully, which is to clean up the bank and move it onwards. Because of the nature of the business plan and the business activity, where it wasn't significantly a retail bank and everything else and all the rest, our analysis was, as taken to the commission of the Central Bank, taken to the troika and ultimately to the Government, that the Irish banking sector would not necessarily benefit from having the exercise of trying to make that bank into a working bank into the future. We may have been right, we may have been wrong, I don't know, but that was ultimately, the analysis was-----