Mr. John Moran:

I ... I do ... I couldn't talk very specifically, right, but I think Ann's coming in later, you could ... you could also ask her, she'll have time to prepare, to check. We were trying to monitor it as best we could, right? But remember we didn't have ... we weren't running the bank, right, so at best, I mean, without actually raising a hare in the bank itself, we were asking them for their daily, sort of, liquidity deposit numbers. It may have been, and I don't know because maybe they were getting that as a matter of course from all the banks so as not to ... to have that information, but without necessarily raising an issue. On the question of timing, without any question, we would have preferred, in effect, to have done this a day later. Because a day later was when the European Central Bank board was meeting to actually address the issue of the conversion. And, had that happened, and we would have actually been able to do things differently.

We were prepared, if we needed to, to actually split the two into two measures, right, which was the liquidation of the bank ... what that meant in terms of the transfer of the security into the Central Bank and then finalise the arrangements in terms of the replacement of the bonds or, sorry, the promissory note, for the bonds that was occurring. But you're right, if we could have planned this and if we could have controlled all the elements, we would have preferred to have been able to have had the discussion you and I had about the legislation the following evening, once the ECB had taken their decision or whatever it was to unanimously note what was going to happen.