Mr. Kevin Cardiff:

They can't be costed because you don't ... because they don't ... they ... each of them costs zero unless something goes wrong. And there is no way of assessing the probability ... no realistic way, that night, of assessing the probability of things going wrong. But there were some concerns about some of them, reasonable concerns. The first was ... if you think about the idea of a direct loan, from the Exchequer resources, for example. Well, we had the cash, we had a lot put aside, but, you know, in terms of capital, in terms of the Exchequer, €20 billion is a lot of money. In terms of the overall size of the banking system, €20 billion might get you only a couple weeks down the line, if you'd a real out and out run at wholesale and retail level. And then you'd be the Exchequer that had no cash. You know, only your day-to-day cash, but not much. So there were pros and cons of everything, and there ... the liquidity swap arrangement was at a very advanced level. In fact, the final documentation on that was ... it was finalised at 4 o'clock that morning, so it was ready to go, whoever ... whatever bright spark was still working at that stage. So, that was ready to go, and it was ... it had quite a lot of positives, but it had some of the same negatives as the guarantee, which was that this worked by putting the Exchequer's credit behind the banks, so if there was a loss in the banks, there could be a loss on that. It was ... it would have been more collateralised than a guarantee, but still.