Oireachtas Joint and Select Committees

Thursday, 18 June 2015

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis

Nexus Phase

Mr. Kevin Cardiff:

Sectoral advice in relation to particular issues, yes, and, for example, on the one big element that I had that was to do with property in 2005 and 2006, my specific advice was, "Look at these evaluations - we've done a really professional job, I hope, of evaluating, I think, it was 23 different tax headings, these must stop but they must stop in a phased way so that you don't precipitate a faster reaction in the market than you want." Now, the truth is, Deputy, that most people who saw the crash coming or who now say they saw the crash coming, saw it too late to be in a position to undo most of the damage. And even those people who had an inkling and there were some, in the official system as elsewhere, that things were now in a dangerous spot in space ... at that point, say, end of 2006 and so forth. The quandary at that point was, you know, how do you climb down ... like you're on the cliff, the wind is blowing, how do you climb down off the cliff without precipitating the crash? So, as I said, the thing I was involved in at the time, the property tax exemptions, which was a big enough thing - we were saying "Yes, you have to stop these but watch out for this slippy slope that you might actually create a ... create the event that you're trying to avoid", and it was also by, by certainly in '07 but even by '06, it was a bit of a problem in the construction sector. We knew that construction, even kept going in 2007 but in '06, the end of '06, there were small changes or retrospectively smallish looking changes in the rules and mortgages and so forth. But you could see that there was now a top ... kept going a little bit but there was a sort of a top to the market but you couldn't just say, "Well, let's, let's draw a line." Let's say at that point that suddenly we'll cut credit by 20% because you'd have a ... you know, you would precipitate the crisis even earlier than it happened. Maybe, in retrospect, if you knew you were going to have the crisis and there was no soft landing, you would choose to do it earlier rather than later but the soft landing, the soft landing looked in prospect and what people were talking about when they talked about that in the official system, it wasn't a soft landing in a sense of, "Ah, it'll be no problem, lads." It was a soft landing in the sense of,Yes, you might lose 3% or 4% or 5% off your GDP but you'd be able to manage it. So for the-----

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