Mr. Kevin Cardiff:

In retrospect no, not because of the board members themselves, who had a range of expertise of different types, but because it now seems, and it's easy to say in retrospect, it now seems they weren't getting the kind of information that you might want them to get. I wasn't there, I don't know what they were getting but I would have assumed they were getting a lot of data on concentration limits, on who borrowers were and so forth. We had a bit of a problem, in the Department of Finance we used to have a process that when the Governor, when the Secretary General got board papers, he would sort of circulate them around the Department for comment. But the 33AK stuff and all the rest, that started to seem like it mightn't be fully legal so that practice stopped. But before it stopped, which was back in the 90s, I used to see Central Bank papers and they would have things like ... I don't know if they had names but they would certainly have lists of big concentrations and they would have ... there would be regular reporting that would suggest these things were being looked into, and maybe they still were but I don't know. So if they ... so, depending on the quality of the information they were getting, I think the quality of decision-making. But also remember there was an enormous pressure, huge pressure on the new regulatory system to spend a great deal of time on consumer matters. That is not ... it is not a flaw but if it was at the expense of prudential matters, then it had a consequence and, you know, it was probably a feature of the thing being newish even in 2007. If it was a more settled organisation, the consumer side would have been up and running and they mightn't have had to give it, you know, relatively speaking, so much attention and they might have spent more time on the prudential side.