Mr. David Doyle:

In relation to that particular statement that you have there in that presentation - that State guarantees are not part of the toolkit - that was the view, that State guarantees should not be part of the toolkit. And right through ... like, the ... when people did their crisis exercises, my recollection is, from what I was told, is that the reaction of the central bankers, the regulators, was, "Well, based with this hypothetical crisis that you're looking at now, the Government will have step in with cash." That was their first reaction. Our reaction was that's not the first thing to do, it's to try and see can you resolve it on trade acquisition or trade sale or merger-disposal situation. Now, by the time September arrived, you had the international financial meltdown taking place; you had Bradford & Bingley being nationalised; you had German banks being nationalised; you had Lehman's being let go to the wall; so towards the end of that month, the view down in Dame Street was that the financial markets had become so crisis bound that, as a last resort, a guarantee would have to be considered. That was the view that started to emerge the week before this down in Dame Street, because of the huge flows of liquidity and what was going on internationally, that it would have to be considered.