Kieran O'Donnell (Limerick City, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

You've made reference to everyone else stating that the banks were solvent on the night. Do you believe, based on ... do you believe that the banks were solvent on the night of the guarantee? And, more particularly, I want to draw reference to a ... a memorandum from the 25th, page 27, where you say "D Doyle noted that Government would need a good idea of the potential loss exposures within Anglo and [Irish Nationwide Building Society] - on some assumptions [Irish Nationwide Building Society] would be 2bn after capital and Anglo could be [€8.5, obviously, billion]." And I'm referencing that back to the Department of Finance document from Merrill Lynch, where Merrill Lynch states in their document that, and I quote, "However [this is about Irish Nationwide] there are concerns over the influence of the Chief ... In the extreme stress case analysis the total writeoffs including loss of interest income would ... [would] just deplete most of [Irish Nationwide] reserves of €1.8 billion."- which is really very close to the €2 billion you speak about ... Irish Nationwide Building Society - and, secondly, about Anglo Irish "If one [were] to apply [Irish Nationwide] stress case scenario the writeoffs would deplete ordinary shareholders and other lower category subordinated debt of €7.5 billion". The overall capital that Anglo had at the time was just over €9 billion. So, based on what I read there and your own pronouncements in ... on the ... the memo of 25 September, did you believe Anglo and Irish Nationwide Building Society were solvent on the night of the guarantee?