Mr. David Doyle:

Okay. Well, my recollection is that at a board meeting the previous day or two days ... I think it was the previous day, that the Governor at that meeting said that up to that point his conclusion, having regard to all the analysis available to him, was that a guarantee shouldn't be part of the suite of measures, but that given where things were now he felt that, for the first time, that a guarantee would have to be contemplated.

And in the light of that, then, I posed the question, "What are the implications of that going to be, for the sovereign debt cost?" Now, in Brendan's note, which actually wasn't copied to me at the time ... what the note at the top ... oh, yes, it was ... I'm sorry it was, it was forwarded on by William ... what Brendan's note is saying there, a 1% increase in debt costs, and the debt ... national debt at the time was €50 billion, so that's going to cost €500 million. The reference to €110 million nationalised bank is a separate issue. That was hypothetical and if it had been nationalised, in fact, it wasn't going to be on the basis of the State writing cheques to make up for the borrowing of those nationalised banks, so it's ... I don't think the read ... I can see where he was coming from, but it was going to be, we were going to be underwriting ... the nationalisation would have meant that we would have been standing behind the borrowing of the banks, not actually, borrowing the money. So we're like the State, like the borrowing of the ESB which ... so what was really critical there was the 1% and the half a billion that that was involved in the additional servicing cost, and that was the figure around which the fees for the guarantee centred, in, in the days after the guarantee had been decided.