Mr. Liam O'Reilly:

The capital ratio. Well, there were two. Really, the way it was applied in the end was capital requirements were ... were required. And it seemed to be too little too late. And I know that - I might as well mention it now - that in on the 15th ... or some time in August 2005, Con Horan came to, well through Pat Horan ... Pat Neary, came to me with a suggestion on this. And I brought the idea to the director general of the Central Bank and the reasons for not applying it at that stage were that at that stage house prices were stabilising, interest rates were set to rise and property prices were stabilising. So ... but, generally, it ... they were brought again very quickly after that and they were applied. But, as Professor Honohan says, they were not ... they were not effective. And I suppose, just on a theoretical basis, the biggest problem was ... and I think capital ratios were the way to go - increasing capital ratios or capital requirements. The question was: what was the precise relationship between a 1% or an X% in the capital ratio and how it would affect credit? And I don't think enough work had been done on that relationship. And there would've been a danger, unless that work was done, that it would've ... it would've been either too easy or even ground the system to a halt. And there was a question of how that should be done and that comes back to my point that, I think, if there had been a unit in between of economists and accountants and maybe call them financial accountants ... financial economists ... if that had of been there, it would have been useful. As a matter of fact, the Larosière report says that the word "macro-prudential policy" didn't seem to enter the English language in any real way until after the crisis.