Mr. John Hurley:

My recollection is slightly different. My recollection is that the plenary meeting that I described ... the first plenary meeting, there was a very broad discussion on the options and I think the view was that we should tease out the different options. And Mr. Lenihan, Minister Lenihan, would have been very anxious that that would have been done and that the different options ... all of the different options would be looked at. So, in that context, yes, he did ask that this issue would be examined but so did others and, in fact, it was the sense of the meeting that it needed to be examined. But, in relation to subordinated debt, this, essentially I think, discussion on subordinated debt occurred at a second meeting ... a second plenary meeting, as I would describe it, after the first meeting with the banks. And at that second meeting, we would have been considering ... having come to a decision about what was the best option ... considering the other elements, for example, subordinated debt, and that was surfaced and discussed and the issue that ... and Mr. Lenihan would have been involved in that discussion and would have been anxious that it was discussed. But the issue that was involved was ... do we take the risk of not including subordinated debt when it is not such a big issue in terms of costs in the context of the overall guarantee? Certainly significant when you look at it in isolation and look at the cost involved but the issue wasn't that. The issue is we have to present a coherence to the markets, the markets are volatile, the American TARP had gone down, there was a sense in which, you know, you didn't quite know how the markets would open the following morning. So, if you weren't coherent and if you didn't really present well and the markets didn't understand your message, all of the work could go for naught.