Mr. John Hurley:

My memory of the discussions was that it was in the context of what expectations were at the time. We were expecting strong growth here.

We were expecting internationally strong growth. The discussions of ECOFIN would have been the same. It was ... there was a very positive background. But what happened was entirely different. The crisis that erupted from the United States was wholly unexpected by Europe and wholly unexpected at ECOFIN. And the consequences of that was that ... really the earlier actions being taken in a more benign environment don't sit well with the result that ... with the actions that had to be taken subsequently.

The scale of the adjustment that took place following the decisions of the United States was ... has been absolutely extraordinary. No one expected Lehman's to fall, no one expected that it would be bankrupt. Europe was in shock as a consequence of that. And the United States, I think, subsequently, was in shock. The scale of adjustment and damage that was done by that decision is immense. And I think, as we go through our assessment of this over the years, that the real severity of that shock is going to really come home. We ... I know now in some of the reports there's a suggestion that, you know, heavily qualified ... that that shock wasn't that significant. I think it's hugely significant. And I recall that when you had economists before this meeting recently - I think it was Mr. McArdle - and I would agree with his view ... essentially, the adjustment as a result of Lehman's and the shock to confidence in the banking system, in my view, has been hugely underestimated.