Mr. John McDonnell:

Was it? Sorry, no I ... sorry, Senator. It was wholly unprecedented. There was absolutely no expectation in the marketplace that someone of the size of Lehmans would collapse. There was no ... the market was stunned with the actual immediacy of the impact of that on wholesale markets and the interbank markets closed down at that point in time, so there was ... and therefore there was a heavy dependency on funding from the ECB and the banks were aware of that and the discussions ... they would have had ongoing discussions with the Central Bank and we were well aware of that. We would have been heavily involved in that and, as part of our audit procedures, we would have sought to have detailed discussions with the banks. We would have overlooked the collateral, over the full period, now, because this runs on into 2010 and 2011. We would have had detailed debates with our head of risk. When I got involved, I would have been discussing with our global head of risk how other banks were looking at going concern. We would have detailed conversations with the directors, the head of treasury, the person responsible for ensuring the collateral is in place, the head of deposits, the audit committee, the court. We would have discussions with ... We would have had a technical panel and that technical panel ... so, in terms of, for the audit partner to make a decision, because the serious in this, we would have had a technical panel so we would have had a conversation with our peers and that would have included our head of risk, our head of audit, some senior partners who are very good and versed in business risks, our head of accounting technical. I would have met with the Financial Regulator, the NTMA, the Department of Finance, the Central Bank. So we took this very, very seriously as did the bank, took it very, very seriously.