Timmy Dooley (Clare, Fianna Fail) | Oireachtas source

I welcome Mr. Masding and his presentation and thank him for his presentation. The opening part of the contribution painted a relatively positive picture of his institution. He spoke about the restructuring plan and the raising of capital, and he indicated that the institution now appears to be on a road towards a vibrant force focused on the Irish retail banking market, capable of delivering value for both customers and shareholders. The presentation is peppered with phrases like "fiduciary duty" and "responsibility" to the shareholder. Does Mr. Masding accept that his recovery is largely based on the backs of the 79,000 standard variable rate mortgage holders? It is based on the fact that the institution is gouging 4.5% interest from these customers at a time when the rates that Permanent TSB is paying for the funds has been reduced.

Mr. Masding profiled where the institution is not getting its funds. We were told in November 2014 that the cost of funds was approximately 1.74% and it is probably less now. The delegation has somehow suggested that the costs of funds is high, disguising to an extent what that is. Will Mr. Masding identify the cost of funds in that regard? It is clear that those 79,000 mortgage holders do not believe they are getting any value from the product they have with Permanent TSB. They would feel rightly frustrated, as taxpayers and shareholders in the company, that they are being disproportionately impacted in comparison with other taxpayers in the State. I cannot understand how the institution can continue to present a position that effectively recapitalises the bank and puts it on a firm footing - leading to eventual selling and trading - when it is done on the backs of people who are being disproportionately affected at this time. I cannot see how the institution can continue to justify charging 4.5%, effectively because it can, while suggesting that it is necessary to do this in order to discharge losses elsewhere. They are unrelated. If there are issues in other elements of the bank, other methodology should be found to deal with that. It should not be done on the backs of those 79,000 mortgage holders.

The delegation spoke of the arrangement it has with the European Commission and that over time the bank will have to reduce or sell off some of the higher-risk loans. I assume that will relate to tracker mortgages in default. Will the witness identify the value of that business? The deadline is 2018 for that sale and it is not clear how much of that tracker book is in default. There was a gross value of approximately €14.9 billion around the end of 2014. How does the bank intend to deal with that default portion? The Springboard Irish sub-prime mortgage book was sold to Mars Capital and is it intended to do something similar here? In the past, there was talk of curing the issue rather than selling loans. Is there a process to this end or will it ultimately come to a sale, as with Springboard? If that ends up being the case, does the witness accept that it would effectively amount to outsourcing repossession rather than curing the issue?