Mr. Brian Goggin:

Okay, I mean, the issue confronting us on 29 September was the fact that I and the governor of the Bank of Ireland had been put on notice that afternoon that Anglo Irish Bank was going to default the following day. Now this was an extremely grave piece of news to receive - as it happened the governor of the Bank of Ireland had a pre-arranged meeting with the Governor of the Central Bank that afternoon, it was pre-arranged to assist my unsuccessful efforts to get the collateral rules at the ECB broadened and when the governor of the Bank of Ireland returned from that meeting, he informed me that he had advised the Governor of the Central Bank of our meeting earlier that afternoon with the chairman and chief executive of Anglo and brought to the attention of the Governor of the Central Bank that Anglo was going default the following day on a liability that was maturing. Richard Burrows advised me that the Governor of the Central Bank informed him that there was little he could do, little the Governor of the Central Bank could do at that stage.

So, you know, I was in receipt of information that was profound. We had been earlier in that day requested by the Central Bank to consider taking over Irish Life & Permanent.