Mr. Dermot Gleeson:

Well, remember that the system had proffered to us the day before - to Mr. Sheehy, should I say - that two were likely to fail. We knew who they were. We knew that Anglo ... we knew who they were. It was Anglo and Nationwide. As to what was being done with them, the system had also proffered the solution that they would be "dealt with", in inverted commas. I didn't give much ... maybe ... I didn't give much reflection to how they would be dealt with. I thought nationalisation was the most likely, but maybe immediate liquidation was possible. But I had so many worries that designing the Government's solution to dismantling these ... I felt that was for the Central Bank and the Attorney General and ... you know, it wasn't one of my headaches, of which there were ample supply.

So, we went in, we were asked by the Taoiseach - very politely - to say what we thought should be done and we said that we thought they should be dealt with and then a guarantee put in place because there would be a turmoil, it would be the front page of all the financial press the next day - "Irish bank taken down" or "nationalised" or whatever it would read - and people in South Korea and Peru would be saying, "I wonder whether I want to give my money to AIB for the next two months." It was against that contingency-----