Mr. Dermot Gleeson:

-----but things were pretty fraught, Senator, as you can imagine, you know. And it was preparatory to going to meet the Minister. See, we had left Government Buildings that night thinking that there were four banks going to survive with the guarantee, and ... the phrases from farther down this memo that I read out earlier, I was ... I suppose it had been presented that we had asked for a guarantee, true, but the guarantee that transpired wasn't the one we'd asked for. But we weren't going to come out and say that, obviously, that wasn't in anyone's interest. So there was an element of peevishness here, which perhaps I ... perhaps I should regret. I mean, as I said to you, I remember the next morning, Goldman Sachs came out and advertised or promoted Anglo as a buy. They said there was an upside of 50 something percent of it as a share buy. And we'd been, sort of, asked to rescue it or to assist in its rescue for a couple of days, the day before. So mixed feelings, can I put it that way.